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Building the BarBican 1962 – 1982:
taking the industry out of 
the dark ages
2
Cover image: Workers on the Turriff Barbican site, 1965
Source: Communist Party of Great Britain




Cover image: Workers on the Turriff Barbican site, 1965
Source: Communist Party of Great Britain
4
Preface
This pamphlet is the second to be produced as part of a two-year University of Westminster 
research project, entitled ‘Constructing Post-War Britain: Building Workers’ Stories, 
1950 – 1970’, which began in August 2010. The project is funded by the Leverhulme Trust 
and aims to collect oral history testimonies from construction workers who were employed on 
five of the highest profile sites and developments of that era: Stevenage New Town; Barbican 
development, City of London; South Bank arts complex; Sizewell A power station; and the M1 
motorway. The aim of the research is both to gain a greater understanding of the processes 
of change within the construction industry during these decades and to highlight the role that 
construction workers played in the creation of the post-war built environment.
For more information see project website buildingworkersstories.com
The researchers on the project are: 
Christine Wall, Linda Clarke, Charlie McGuire and Olivia Muñoz-Rojas
The research for this pamphlet was conducted during August 2010-April 2012. 
Ten ex-workers were interviewed:
*Sadly, William Milne died in December 2011
Vic Heath
former scaffolder
interviewed in Luton on 31 January 2011
William Milne*
former carpenter
interviewed in London on 7 March 2011
Pat Bowen
former plumber
interviewed in London on 22 March 2011
Michael Houlihan
former scaffolder
interviewed in Cornwall on 22 March 2011 
and 27 June 2011
Noel Clarke
former carpenter
interviewed in London on 22 March 2011
John Steeden
former crane erector
interviewed in Stevenage on 10 May 2011
Tony McGing
former crane operator
interviewed in London on 16 June 2011
Clive Morton
former civil engineer
interviewed in London on 9 August 2011
Richard Organ
former plumber
interviewed in London on 15 August 2011
Jim Moher
former bricklayer’s labourer
interviewed in London on 6 February 2012
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introduction
Designed by Chamberlin, Powell and Bon, the Barbican re-development embodied new ideas 
about living and working.  But although innovative in concept and design, the re-development 
was also notable for the many difficulties that accompanied its construction. The workers 
engaged in this process faced a wide range of problems, including major design flaws, an 
outdated industrial relations framework, a relatively untried payment system, and health and 
safety hazards. Although engaged in the construction of a celebrated landmark of modern 
architecture they were subject to the most backward and dangerous of conditions. Many who 
built the Barbican responded to these difficulties with imagination and integrity. And in an 
industry that was notorious for its casualised, non-union nature, they tried to fashion a new 
way forward for trade unionism; one that was based on the principle of greater unity between 
all building workers; and one that was capable of providing for all building workers decent 
levels of pay, stable employment and good working conditions.
Clive MortonNoel Clarke Michael Houlihan John Steeden Jim Moher
William Milne Pat Bowen Tony McGing Vic Heath Richard Organ
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Crane erectors on Laing Barbican site
Source: Courtesy of John Steeden.
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the BarBican
The Barbican re-development was one of the 
show-case, publicly-funded projects of the 
1960s. Designed by the architectural practice 
Chamberlin, Powell and Bon, which had 
previously won the competition to design the 
adjacent Golden Lane estate, the plan was 
for an innovative combination of housing and 
landscaping, as well as a school, business 
centre, pond and major arts centre, all spread 
out over forty acres and constructed of  in situ 
concrete. The three architects visited urban 
developments in Italy and Sweden to gather 
inspiration, and their design includes many 
of the features characteristic of Le Corbusier’s 
architecture: towers, terraces, walkways 
separating pedestrians from wheeled traffic, 
gardens, open spaces and concrete as the 
main construction material 1. The result is an 
exemplary Brutalist building complex, which 
nevertheless, as some authors point out, has 
something medieval about it 2, physically 
mirroring the etymology of the term ‘barbican’, 
a fortification outside the city. Located in 
Cripplegate, an area that had been destroyed 
by the Luftwaffe during World War Two, and 
home to just 48 people, the idea was to create 
a tranquil and spacious city within the City of 
London and to re-populate a district that had 
been in serious decline for over a century 
by housing 6,500 mainly middle-class 
professionals 3. The Barbican began in 1962 
and was completed in six phases, the first being 
the development of Milton Court, which 
included various public service buildings. 
The main housing developments were phases 
II, III and IV, built by Turriff Ltd, John Laing and 
Sons, and Myton (a subsidiary company of 
construction giant Taylor Woodrow) respectively. 
Phase V, the Barbican Arts Centre built by 
Laing, and phase VA, the final residential tower 
built by Robert McAlpine Ltd, commenced 
in the early 1970s.
The Barbican stands today as an important 
architectural achievement, which has been 
awarded grade II listed status as a result 
of its architectural interest, scale, plan 
and cohesion. But the development also 
attracted attention and became famous, 
or infamous, for the serious difficulties that 
accompanied its construction. In many 
respects, the building of the Barbican 
encapsulated many of the deeper problems 
that were developing in the construction 
industry in this period, including tensions 
in the relationship between the design 
and execution of these vast projects; 
shortcomings in the ability of construction 
companies to effectively manage such 
projects; flaws in the tendering process; 
the over-concentration on the traditional 
craft occupations, including in terms of trade 
union organisation, employee representation 
and for training purposes, despite the ever 
growing importance of newer occupations, 
such as concreting, plant operation, 
scaffolding and crane driving; the impact 
of labour-only sub-contracting and the often 
chaotic and arbitrary bonus systems that 
operated on large sites; and the unitarist 
industrial relations approaches of many 
large building firms, who often viewed 
site activists as deviants who should be 
drummed out of the industry altogether. 
This led to massive delays in the completion 
of the project; a huge escalation in costs; 
attempts by two major contractors to quit 
the site altogether, one of which was 
successful; strikes and a year-long lock-out, 
which resulted in a government Court of 
Inquiry and the blacklisting of many building 
workers. Few who worked on the Barbican 
will ever forget it. And this is the story of 
how it was built, in the words of some of 
those who carried out the building work.





The first contractor on the Barbican was 
Robert McAlpine. Before any work could 
begin, the site had to be cleared of over 
150,000 cubic yards of bombed ruins. Using 
tractor shovels, it was possible to clear over 
4000 square yards per day.4 After the site 
was cleared, building began, on phase I. 
The contract was won in April 1962 by J 
Jarvis and Sons, who submitted the lowest 
tender of £467, 250. This contract ended 
up running over and was subject to industrial 
relations problems, including a bonus dispute. 
In May 1963, Chamberlin, Powell and Bon 
reported to London Corporation’s Barbican 
Development Committee (BDC) that there had 
been several meetings between themselves 
and the contractor, Jarvis and Sons, which was 
blaming ‘labour problems’ for the delays and 
indicating that the site might eventually run over 
by 6 months.5 Looking to avoid penalties, Jarvis 
and Sons argued that the clause in its contract, 
which allowed for extensions to be granted in 
the event of delays caused by ‘combinations 
of workmen’, should be invoked, as it covered 
the ‘go slows’ blamed for the delays.6
Phase II of the Barbican included the 43-storey 
Cromwell tower and the City of London Girls 
School, as well as a number of other, smaller 
maisonette blocks and car parks. There were 
629 flats in this phase. The tendering process 
began in late 1962, as did London Transport’s 
tendering process for the rail line work. Twelve 
contractors were contacted and asked to 
submit tenders, with eight agreeing to do so. 
Preliminary discussions with the eight began 
soon after.7 In the event, seven tenders were 
submitted, the lowest of which was Turriff’s at 
£6,180, 000, almost £1.5 million lower than 
the highest tender, that of Trollope and Colls, 
but with less than £3,000 separating it from 
John Laing’s. After some negotiation and delay, 
caused also by the fact that the Barbican 
Committee could not make a final decision 
on phase II until the railway line contract 
was decided, Turriff was awarded the 
contract for a price of £6m. 
The closeness of the two bids for phase II 
encouraged BDC to dispense with selective 
tendering for phase III and to seek a 
negotiated contract with Laing, on the basis 
of its phase II tender. The suspension of 
the Committee’s own standing orders was 
justified on the grounds of the similarity of 
phases II and III, so that similar price rates 
could be expected for phase III. BDC also 
cautioned against the possibility of one 
contractor dominating the development as 
the only company which could match Laing 
in a tender for phase III would be Turriff, 
given the substantial gap between these two 
contractors’ bids and the rest for phase II. The 
Committee also pointed to continually rising 
building costs, arguing that to wait for a new 
tendering process to be completed in 1964 
would entail higher prices. The fact that there 
was already a tender from Laing meant that 
any increases in costs would be, in the BDC’s 
own words, ‘authentic’ increases.8 Finally, the 
Committee considered that the Laing tender 
would allow for an earlier start to be made 
on phase III, leading to earlier completion 
and receipt of rental payments from tenants. 
Negotiations began and in March 1964 
Laing was awarded the five-year contract, 
worth just under £6m.
4 Labour News, 4 May 1961
5 London Metropolitan Archives, (LMA), BDC Minutes, 13 May 
1963. 
6 LMA, BDC Minutes, 23 September 1963
7 LMA, BDC Minutes, 19 November 1962
8 Ibid
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Phase IV of the Barbican development went 
out to a selective tender in the summer of 
1964. This phase was similar to phases 
II and III, minus the 43-story tower, and 
contained 573 flats, commercial showrooms, 
a hostel, car park, two pubs, a petrol station 
and a restaurant. Mowlem won the contract 
to clear and pile the site, worth £220,801, 
but did not enter the bidding for the building 
work, which was awarded in November 
1964 to Myton, a subsidiary of Taylor 
Flats on the Barbican Estate, Photograph 1960s by John Gay. © English Heritage.NMR Reference Number: AA098616.
Woodrow, on a tender of £5,581,022 to be 
completed in three years.9 Myton’s bid was 
the lowest of six, drawn from a select list of 
contractors, well below the highest tender 
of £6,360,640 and almost £300,000 lower 
than that of its nearest competitor, Trollope 
and Colls.10  
9 LMA, BDC Minutes, 30 April 1964
10 LMA, BDC Minutes, 5 November 1964. Taylor Woodrow 
   owned around 85% of Myton.
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starting work on the BarBican
At the peak of the building process, the 
Barbican sites employed around a thousand 
workers. It was a diverse workforce, including 
workers from all parts of Britain, large 
numbers of Irishmen, Jamaicans and others 
from different parts of the West Indies, Sikhs 
from India and Eastern Europeans. Vic Heath 
was a scaffolder from Camden Town in North 
London. In his early thirties at the time, he 
had worked previously on major sites such 
as the Shell Mex building on the South Bank. 
Like most workers, the route that took him 
onto employment at Turriff’s Barbican site in 
1965 was fairly informal:
I’d finished the job in Waite’s in Edgware 
Road, and I was out of work for about a week. 
I was just punting around, and somebody told 
me the site had started on the Barbican — it 
might have been Max Bayer — and he said 
they were looking for scaffolders. So I went 
down there to the timekeeper’s office on the 
gate and said I was applying for a scaffolder’s 
job. I went through some sort of a silly bloody 
interview with somebody who knew nothing 
about scaffolding, but asked me a lot of 
questions about everything, and I got the job.
Another scaffolder, 31-year old Michael 
Houlihan, originally from County Kildare in 
Ireland, had been working on sites in London 
for several years. He had also recently been 
employed on the South Bank development 
and recalled how the pub was often the way 
that news about new jobs spread: 
The pub was the Labour Exchange at that 
time. You meet blokes in the pub and say, oh, 
there’s a good job, so and so. You would just 
go down there on the off-chance and you’d 
get in.
Dubliner Noel Clarke, who worked on 
Laing’s Barbican site, also remembered the 
importance of the pub:
When the job would be coming near a 
finish, they’d come round and they’d say to 
you, “We’ve got to finish up so many this 
Friday.” Thursday, they’d say “You’re down 
for tomorrow,” they’re letting you go like, you 
know – there’s about six going tomorrow. Hop 
over the fence and go out and have a look, 
have a look round. You might be gone half 
an hour and you’d have a job – you might 
have two jobs!  That’s how plentiful work 
was. Or else, if you wanted to take pot-luck 
and you didn’t bother, you went to a couple of 
pubs at the weekend, up around Holloway, the 
Archway, all around Holloway. You wouldn’t 
have to go very far. They’d be actually 
tapping you on the shoulder – “Are you busy?” 
you know. “How much a shift do you get?”  
Teenager Jim Moher, from County Tipperary 
in Ireland was looking to save some money 
to go to university. He got his start as a 
bricklayer’s labourer on the Barbican courtesy 
of a cousin, who worked in a bar frequented 
by building workers.
So, I was about 19 when I came to London, 
and I arrived first of all in Clapham North, 
and my cousin had a job in a pub in Clapham 
called the Plough. His name was David 
Sherlock. And I woke him up one Saturday 
morning [laughing] and said, “Any jobs?” and 
he fixed me up with this foreman bricklayer 
who used to come into the Plough, so I got 
this job, assisting the bricklayers.
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 William Milne was a twenty-five year old 
carpenter from Aberdeen. He had never 
worked in England before and owed his start 
on the Barbican in 1967 to the fact that his 
employer—who was sub-contracted to install 
all windows and doors on the main Barbican 
contracts—was a fellow-Scot who held particular 
views regarding the alleged merits of Scottish 
workers over their English counterparts: 
A friend of mine says, “There’s a job – do you 
fancy going down to London?” Now, this friend 
of mine was a married man with four kids. So 
I says, “Why not?” He’s English – the boss is a 
guy from Peterhead, further up from Aberdeen, 
but he’d moved to St Helen’s in Lancashire. He 
actually lived there, and he preferred Scotsmen 
working to him than Englishmen, because we 
worked harder. There was a few Geordies and 
Glaswegians as well, but dole offices were 
applying for men for the Barbican.
Plumber Richard Organ, from North London, 
was in his early twenties and working for 
Audrey Plumbing. He owed his start on the 
Laing’s site to the fact that he was one of the 
few in that company who was a member of 
the Plumbing Trades Union (PTU).
I was working on a block of luxury flats in 
Swiss Cottage in 1966, and the reason why 
I really remember it is because it was the 
year we won the World Cup. And one of the 
mates we had on the job had an accident, and 
he wasn’t in the union – I wasn’t in the union 
at the time – and was off work for a time. 
Anyway, when he came back, and he was 
saying he would have to go to a solicitor to 
make a compensation claim, and one of the 
plumbers, who came from Ealing actually, 
said, “If you’d have been in the union, the 
union solicitors would have taken up a case 
for you”. Nothing of the union had ever been 
mentioned beforehand, so I said to him, 
“Well, you know, how do you join and what is 
the contributions?” and he said, “Oh, I’ll 
get you an application form,” and so I joined 
the union, the old plumbers’ trade union in 
1966. Then the company started a contract 
on the Barbican and they were having to employ 
new staff because it was such a big contract. It 
got unionised, and so they came round to their 
workforce, asking who’s in the union, because 
they wanted their regulars that they knew to 
be sent down there. They didn’t want militants, 
but unfortunately, they didn’t realise, I became 
a militant!
The scale of the Barbican also had an impact 
on the newly employed workers. Again, 
Richard Organ explains:
Well, it impressed you, the size of the contract, 
because Laing’s probably had the biggest part 
of the contract because they had the one tower 
block and I think it was four smaller blocks 
that went round in a square, with like a lake 
in the middle, and they also built the Barbican 
Centre, the Theatre and that. That was all part 
of Laing’s.
Early stages of the Barbican scheme, photograph c.1963 
by John Gay. © English Heritage. 
NMR Reference Number: AA099222
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working conditions
The Turriff site was the first of the major 
contracts to get going. Vic Heath recalls the 
grim conditions faced by the workers in the 
early days and the struggle to improve them:
Absolutely appalling. There were no toilets, 
no proper toilet facilities, the site was quite 
a big site, an enormous site really. It was 
covering a lot of ground, a lot of mud, and 
set in three different places on the site were 
toilets. That was wooden boxes with a toilet 
inside, with a chemical in the toilet, so you 
didn’t have a flush. You had nowhere to 
wash your hands, nothing like that. There 
was no canteen as such. We was expected 
to have our tea sitting on the scaffold or 
wherever and bring it with you. In a very 
short period of time, we decided that we 
needed flush toilets, that was the first thing, 
and management said they weren’t prepared 
to, at this stage in the job – the job had to be 
two storeys high before they’d [do that]. So 
we said, well, alright then, if we’re not going 
to have flush toilets, what we’ll do is use the 
toilets at St Paul’s. St Paul’s Cathedral was 
a fair little walk up the road, and they had 
public toilets there. So, the management said, 
oh, you can’t do that. I said, well, that’s what 
we’re going to f...have to do because we’re 
not going to use these toilets anymore. So the 
men started walking up towards St Paul’s 
to go to the toilet, set up by us. So one lad 
would go off up the road towards St Paul’s, 
and then one, after a short interval, would 
go behind him and so on, and so, within half 
an hour, near enough half of the men on the 
site was walking up towards St Paul’s, and 
as they finished in the toilet and walked back 
down again, there was somebody to take 
their place.
Michael Houlihan had similar recollections 
of the Myton site, where he started work at 
the beginning of January 1966:
It was right in the ground. They were still 
doing the groundwork levels and the crane 
wasn’t even erected when I was there and…
I was there quite a while before there was a 
crane.  We were just doing the columns and 
all that kind of stuff. Obviously, when you go 
on a new job you’ve got to establish certain 
conditions and wages and if you don’t do 
that in its infancy, you’re lost like throughout 
the whole of the thing. You’ve got to establish 
certain bonus schemes, canteen facilities, 
changing room facilities – these things. Well, 
mostly, at that time, it was a very primitive 
kind of set-up that you had in building. They 
had a big hole in the ground with quick lime 
for a toilet and a bit of galvanise round it.  
Well, I helped, having become shop steward 
and giving them their due, they accepted that 
what I was saying was correct. We had a 
changing room. We had the correct number 
of toilets for the amount of employees that 
were on the job, and I got some roller towels 
and things.
13
Close up of Turriff tower block. 
Source: Construction News, 27 April 1967
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the work
Some of the work at the Barbican posed 
challenges, and led to workers learning 
new skills.
I’d never done hanging scaffolding in my life, 
never thought much about it, but I had taken 
some instruction on that, and on the Barbican 
level, which is all based on the Roman thing, 
30 foot from the ground, I suppose, and we 
put hanging scaffolds there, all the way along 
the podium level. So you’d build a scaffold 
up, on the inside, then put your tubes out, 
and then you’d drop your standards down, 
and you’d put something on the bottom, you 
know, you’d fix…the fittings on the bottom, 
and then you’d put braces up, so the scaffold 
could come down below the podium level, 
and they could scabble it and do whatever 
they wanted to do..On the Barbican, I learnt 
and I went on to use that hanging scaffolding 
several times, worked in the docks and 
different places, where you couldn’t put a 
scaffold down basically, or over a glass area 
– so that was very useful, knowledge to have, 
and I daresay I could do it now if I had to! It 
was the first time I’d done it, on the Barbican.
(Vic Heath)
Vic Heath also recalled a major flaw in the 
design of the towers:
The tower block, on the corner, that had gone 
up four floors, and the engineers said that it 
couldn’t go any further, and so they had to 
underpin it all, 40 foot down, and build a big 
steel structure underneath it, and they poured 
hundreds and hundreds of tons of concrete 
into that, as an anchor, otherwise, if it had 
gone up any further, it would have fallen over.
The Barbican was built using poured concrete, 
which was later worked up to provide a 
rugged finish. The use of in-situ concrete 
meant that a lot of the work revolved around 
the construction of shuttering. Dublin carpenter, 
Noel Clarke remembers:
You kick-off just gone eight o’clock, none of this 
lolling around. You had to be on your marks. It 
was donkey work; to be honest with you had to 
be strong. You were humping these acros and 
the boxes, big boxes. It depends on the height 
of the floors. Sometimes, you might have to 
get the crane. It was big walls. You’d have to 
hook the crane on. And then drop them into 
place, and then you’d have to bolt them. There 
was big strong backs on them, metal backs. 
They were all made on the floor, on the deck, 
and then the crane would hook them up on the 
bottom. As you come up the building, the walls 
decreased. Say you’d done a floor, and the 
base, there might be three foot [at] the wall, to 
support, and then, as you went up higher and 
higher, because less weight on – it was taking 
the weight on the basement, from the basement 
up, and then columns got smaller and things 
like that. Not necessarily the columns, but 
the decking – you might get a slab that might 
be two foot, or, about 18 inches. As you 
went up, it decreased… You’d never get any 
less than a 12-inch slab, and then there was 
beams, dropped beams, to support. It was 
complicated, to a degree, but if you done a 
crash-course in the shuttering,as they used to 
call it, it just became easy enough.  
William Milne was employed installing finished 
windows and doors and did not work on the 
shuttering, but recalls the large number of 
carpenters who did this job and, on the Laing 
site, one worker in particular who appears 
to have had come up with a quicker way of 
building it.
There’d have been an awful lot of carpenters, 
because there was a lot of the shuttering. The 
tower blocks are all shuttered, and the eight-
storey buildings, they were all shuttered, so 
that would be carpenters. But I remember 
meeting a Russian guy there as well, and he’d 
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done something with the shuttering to make it 
quicker. And I can’t remember the sum he got 
from John Laing, but he got quite a few bob, 
because they put up a floor every week, the 
shuttering. One floor a week, that’s 
good going.
Some of this shuttering work on the Barbican 
was done by Sikh carpenters. Vic Heath recalls 
them as an exceptionally skilled group of 
workers and solid trade unionists:
They were brilliant carpenters! They used to 
make their own tools. And they were really, 
really clever. I remember my brother worked 
on the Barbican, Fred, who unfortunately is 
also not here with us anymore, but he was 
one of the site agents on-site, and he’d lived 
and worked in Africa, West Africa, for a 
good many years. And I remember one of 
the pricks, the foreman carpenter, saying to 
him, “What the bleeding hell are these blokes 
doing on here? What do they know about 
carpentry?” Fred said, “You ever seen the Taj 
Mahal?”  The bloke didn’t even know what 
he was talking about! They quite obviously 
built buildings long before we even thought 
about building. Another guy, he got the firm 
to give him all the scrap ply. You know, when 
the shuttering’s been used, there’s three-quarter 
ply, they used to invariably discard it, and 
it’d usually go off, off the site, and be burned 
somewhere. This Sikh said could he have four 
sheets, and they said, “Of course you can, – 
take it away.” He got a van and took it home 
and all that lark, and I went round his house, 
oh, months afterwards, say four, five months 
afterwards, and he’d made all of this wood, 
all of this filthy, dirty, bloody three-quarter 
ply, he’d cleaned it all up, and he’d made 
a complete suite, like a chest-of-drawers, 
shelves and all that. He’d made them all out 
of this bloody scrap ply.  Just really clever 
carpenters and they were great union guys. 
The number of apprentices working on the 
Barbican appears to have been low, but 
among some of the specialist trades, such as 
plumbing, there were a few. Pat Bowen was a 
second-year apprentice on the site and recalled 
the type of work he did as involving skills which 
plumbers today would not have learned:
I learnt a lot of skills which were almost 
becoming obsolete, you know, in one sense. 
I mean, they’re still used now for, you know, 
for heritage stuff, but they would be probably 
seen as too labour-intensive and you wouldn’t 
do it like that now. But it made the whole thing 
much more interesting, in a sense, because 
it’s much more skilful. For instance, if you cut 
copper – if you had a three-inch copper pipe, 
you used to have to open a hole in it and then 
bend the pipe to go into it, and then sort of 
weld it up, You got to know, by the colour of 
the copper when you were heating it, there 
was a point where it was going to melt and 
there was a point where it was just right, but 
over time, you got to recognise that colour. 
It’s one of those things you couldn’t teach 
somebody, just say, when it gets to that colour, 
do that, because you can only learn that by 
doing it.
There were also a large number of Irish workers 
on the various Barbican sites, including crane 
operator Tony McGing, from Westport, 
County Mayo. He recalled his work on the 
Turriff site, which involved the careful lifting 
and positioning of the shuttering and concrete 
and some of the problems he had with the 
tower crane that Turriff had hired for the job.
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Crane erectors on Laing Barbican site 
Source: Courtesy of John Steeden
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The people that hired the cranes in the 
beginning had no idea about cranes. They 
hired them in – they were called Kroll. You 
could have your lunch while you waited for 
the lift to come up, 44-storeys up. They were 
very, very, very slow. Well, they wouldn’t be 
44-storey when I was driving. They’d probably 
be up 30 or something like that. It was so slow. 
So they eventually took it down and put up 
a Potain, a fast crane, you know, to do it, to 
finish it off, because they were in the middle of 
the lift shaft. 
And before that, were you always with the 
same banksman?
No, when you went on to the different cranes, 
you had different banksmen, but mostly, when 
you were driving the crane, the cranes along 
the blocks – I think they were only about seven 
floors high – you could see the banksmen. You 
didn’t need radio. But when you went on to the 
44-storey block, you couldn’t see anybody!… 
Totally dependent on the radio then. 
It was unbelievable! You just couldn’t imagine!  
It doesn’t happen today. Because, Sir Robert 
McAlpine’s…you had Myton’s just on this side, 
and you had Sir Robert McAlpine’s on that 
side, and they had a 50HB, which was…
whistled down! You could hear it whistling, it 
was so fast!
And why didn’t you have one like that?
Because probably, in the beginning, this 
company went in and convinced them that 
this was a fantastic crane, which it wasn’t, so 
they hired all Kroll – they’re absolutely useless! 
But the Laing’s site was also 44, and in the 
morning, in the frost and that, you could hear 
[makes noise], flying down, while Turriff’s was 
going [makes slower noise]!
So the work was much slower!
Oh yeah!  If they were earning a pound, 
McAlpine’s should have been earning £2 
per hour, because they were way faster, and 
I don’t think there was a lot of pumps either, 
you know, concrete pumps like you have now, 
pump the concrete up.  It was going up by skip.
Two well-known Irish workers on the Barbican 
were John Dawson, a shop steward on the 
Turriff site, and John Maher, the National 
Federation of Building Trade Operatives’ 
(NFBTO) steward on the Laing site. Limerick 
man Dawson was recalled by Jim Moher:
Johnny was a firebrand, but he was a great, 
militant negotiator. I can still see him coming 
back from meetings with the managers and 
saying, you know, “They offered us a ha’penny 
an hour extra,” a penny an hour, “which was 
ridiculous and we threw that out, and, you 
know, I want you to reject this and take action.” 
And then he’d go back in and he’d come out 
with tuppence. He was a very temperamental 
guy, but he was good… they were emotional 
times, because there was lots of disputes.
Meanwhile, John Maher was rumoured to have 
been responsible for an unexpected sight during 
the ‘topping out’ ceremony on that particular 
site, which was the first of the main Barbican 
contracts to be completed:
They’d set up this topping out ceremony on the 
Laing site, and the day before, they’d put the 
flags up, and they’d put the City of London flag 
up, and the Union flag, you know, Union Jack, 
stuck it up on the top. Of course, the majority 
of the men building there were Irish, so, during 
the night, I don’t know who done it, but it’s 
alleged that Johnny Maher was an instigator, 
they took the Union flag down and put the 
green, white and gold up! And the next day, 
the topping out ceremony was halfway through 
when somebody twigged the green, white 
and gold was up there! (Vic Heath)
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William Milne also recalled this event:
Well, John Laing, it was mostly Irish doing the 
shuttering there, because I know when they 
were coming to open it, somebody stuck the 
Tricolours up and there was one of the royals 
I can’t remember what one was coming to 
open it, and they’re ”Get that flag down 
– get the flag down now!”
The architects’ specification demanded that 
all visible concrete was finished by bush and 
pick-hammering to expose the aggregate. 
Thus, when the shutters were struck, the 
concrete was worked with hand-tools to 
provide the rugged finish that became a 
distinctive characteristic of the Barbican 
scheme. This job was extremely labour-
intensive, dusty and dirty, and was carried 
out by a group of black workers:
It was all poured and then they bush-
hammered. It was black men that done that. 
Yeah, muscular-looking men because they’re 
holding up like a kango, all day long. They 
call it bush-hammering. Instead of being 
smooth, you come up with a rocky sort of 
surface. It makes it look better than a plain 
slab of concrete.
  
That must have been a really time-consuming 
job, the bush-hammering.
Oh it was, it was to a certain extent, but, 
mind you, there wasn’t a lot doing it. I mean 
I remember probably about half a dozen 
coloured guys on it. (William Milne)
Clive Morton was a graduate civil engineer, 
employed by Laing. He remembered the bush 
and pick hammering process.
You can’t do that until the concrete is really 
absolutely cured, otherwise you’d start 
damaging further in than you would wish to, 
so none of it could be attacked before 28 
days. Then, it was done progressively as it 
went up, but it was a horrible dirty job and, 
again, people weren’t given the amount of 
protection they would have been given today. 
The bush-hammering is three heads, which 
go like that, and you’ve just got to hold it. 
So, there was lots of problems of white finger 
vibration and so on...For pick-hammering, 
it’s literally a point or a chisel. What they 
were trying to do was just to take the surface 
concrete off, to expose the aggregate, because 
you couldn’t go deep, you didn’t want them 
to go too deep, but you didn’t want them 
to go too shallow either. And, in a way, it 
looked a crying shame because, you went to 
enormous lengths to make sure you produced 
a beautiful fair-faced bit of concrete and then 
you ruined it. Some people could say, well, 
you didn’t have to worry too much about the 
shuttering.  That’s not true, because, if you 
had any leaks in the shuttering, from a join, 
you would then get a line in the concrete 
because that fluid grout would have been 
seeping out and would leave a line, even 
when you pick-hammered into it. So, you 
couldn’t afford for that fair-face concrete to 
be at all below par.
Pat Bowen also recalled the high building 
standards evident in other aspects of the 
construction:
In those days, all the pipes were still cast-iron 
and the Barbican itself, all of the risers there, 
all of the pipes that go up the 40 floors, or 
35 floors, were all six inch copper pipe. 
When they knock that down, it’ll be worth 
a fortune, but it is untypical, you know, for 
buildings to be so elaborate material-wise.  
And all of the run-outs to the basins were 
all copper and welded. It was a very high 
quality sort of building.
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health and safety
Health and safety was a major concern of 
the workers. The year 1964, when work 
on the main phases of the Barbican began, 
had seen 271 deaths in the construction 
industry, building and civil engineering, and 
over 40,000 reported accidents. Vic Heath 
recalls a particularly serious incident, which 
fortunately did not injure anyone:
They used to have these giant shutters – 20 
foot long, and steel-lined and three-quarter ply 
on the outside, and they used to swing them 
over our heads on the cranes. Well, they 
used to just put cleats across the supporting 
timbers, and of course, on one particular 
occasion, the bloody cleat came undone 
and the shutter fell down 40 foot to the area 
where we were working and smashed all 
the scaffolding, smashed up some of the 
shuttering as well, and we demanded then 
that the shutters be bolted, that they have 
proper bolts, because, normally, they used 
to put bolts right through, with a steel bolt 
holding it, so it couldn’t possibly fall off. They 
wouldn’t do it! A stupid thing like that was 
reasonably cheap to do, in comparison to 
the sort of things they were using, and they 
completely refused to do it, so the scaffolders, 
we walked off the site.  
Tony McGing also recalled another near-miss:
I remember one morning when the Myton 
building started.  We were going for 
breakfast, by the Red Cow pub – there’s a 
restaurant down there. And the crane was 
up, and they were just finishing it off, and 
apparently, they didn’t put in the bolts, and 
we came out and the crane had fallen over.
But there were fatalities on the Barbican:
All the scaffolders on the Barbican were fairly 
well skilled scaffolders, although there was 
a lad killed who fell off the scaffold onto a 
tarpaulin sheet and then went through there.  
He was a young lad, somebody had said he 
was a scaffolder in Ireland, and he came over 
to this country and they employed him and 
let him go to work, and of course he hadn’t 
been a scaffolder in Ireland, at all, and was 
killed. He was only 23. Quite a lot of that 
went on, particularly Irish families coming over 
and bringing their youngsters over with them, 
and getting them jobs on sites, and they had 
no experience of working on a building site. 
Might have been working in a field in Ireland, 
but when you go onto a building site, you’ve 
really got to know what you’re doing.
Vic Heath
Pat Bowen and William Milne remembered 
another fatality:
I didn’t see it actually, but I heard one guy 
got his head taken off because they had 
counterweights in the…it was an external 
hoist, took up John Laing’s block. Well, there 
shouldn’t have been a hole there, but he 
stuck his head through to see if the hoist was 
coming up, and the counterbalance come 
down and, poom. 
Pat Bowen
Somebody, as the external lift came up, put his 
head through to see if it was coming, and had 
got hit by the weights, and was decapitated. 
That was I think the very worst thing I’ve ever 
been in. The site was shut down because, you 
know, there was that death.William Milne
Crane erector John Steeden was employed 
by John Laing and Son, on its phase III site. 
He was a highly-trained worker, who had 
served a five-year apprenticeship in plant 
mechanics with Laing. He recalls a health and 
safety system that was inadequate and a lucky 
escape from what would have been a fatal fall 
off one of the high towers:
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We only had overalls, no harness. They wear 
harnesses nowadays, gloves, protection, ear 
protectors.  We got some gloves eventually 
but seriously dangerous. I could have fallen 
off. I got close to falling off, once, not on the 
cranes, but on that hoist at the Barbican. We’d 
finished with it and they wanted to bring 
it down, we had to bring it down with the 
scaffolders, because the scaffolders needed 
to get their material down. So there was plan, 
simply that they would put all their material 
in the hoist, and it would be brought down, 
taken out, back up, bit by bit, and so we had 
to then, as they came down, we had to bring 
the top of it, the cathead down, every two 
storeys, or whatever it was, two floors, fix it 
up again, because that means that the ropes 
had to be re-rigged and put right because it 
was coming down lower and lower, fit it all 
up, obviously test it, and then they took their 
scaffold down. We used to have to be there 
but not work – the scaffolders, we’d chat to 
them or stay out the way. And I was standing 
talking to one, and he said to me, “John, 
you’re in the “f” way, would you move out 
the way?” and I stepped out of the way onto 
a plank, and this plank wasn’t supported. It 
shot up in the air, and I went – it was in the 
middle of the [square], and I went through.  
Now, I’m on my way from there to the 
bottom, but by luck of god, I landed on two 
planks which were put down below, which 
they were moving, and I came straight down 
onto these two planks, right in the middle of 
them, and the board that I was on came past 
me and finished up at the bottom. So yes, it 
was close. That was the closest I ever got to it. 
It never got reported either. It was just, “Oh 
Christ, you alright John?” “Yeah, I’m fine.” 
You know, and I’d have walked off and sort 
of got into the building and then they just 
carried on and I went down for a cup of tea.
These deficiencies in health and safety 
provisions on the Barbican would continue 
throughout the long re-development process. 
Despite the links that existed between 
asbestos and a variety of fatal lung diseases, 
which were known long before the Barbican 
was designed, the material was still included 
in the specifications. In May 1976, work on 
the Barbican arts centre was halted after the 
main contractor, John Laing, ignored requests 
from workers that piles of asbestos material 
be removed from the site. Expressing the 
view that the workers were not thinking about 
the ‘number of people it saves in a year’, 
Laing project manager H Denning wrongly 
argued that it was only the blue variety of 
asbestos that was dangerous, and that if the 
workers kept the floor wet when sweeping 
the material up, everything would be ok. 12 
The refusal of Laing to remove the asbestos 
led to an all-out strike involving over 500 
workers. Their position was summed up by 
Alf Reid, who was one of the shop stewards 
on the site: ‘Our strike to get the dust out is 
not just about the building of the centre now 
but about the people who move in as well. 
They are planning to use a lot more of it 
here, on a suspended ceiling, for fireproofing 
a cafeteria and for insulation’.13 The strike 
lasted two weeks and was recalled positively 
by convenor steward Jim Franklin ‘When you 
were completely ignored as to the using of 
asbestos on the site before the dispute, we 
did achieve something’. 14
12 Alan Dalton, Asbestos Killer Dust, A worker community  
   guide on how to fight the hazards of asbestos and its   
   substitutes, (London: British Society for Responsibility in 
   Science, 1979), p96
13 Ibid
14 Alan Dalton, op cit, p97
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Building the crane on Laing Barbican 
Source Courtesy of John Steeden
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Crane erectors on Laing tower block
Source: Courtesy of John Steeden
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working time
The normal working day at the Barbican 
generally began at 8 o’clock in the morning 
and finished at 4.30, with a couple of breaks 
in between times.
It was an eight o’clock start there…just work 
right away and then we’d go to Bruno’s – 
it was an Italian café where they’ve got that 
market, John Laing and Turriff’s and all, they 
had canteens there like, you know, but with 
the amount of men, we found it better to go 
to Bruno, – I always remember that was his 
name, Bruno. So that would be at 10 o’clock, 
half an hour break, back, worked till 12.30, 
half an hour break, and then worked till 
4.30, and home. 
William Milne
Some of the Barbican workforce did work 
overtime and Saturday mornings. Concrete 
pours could go on until well into the night, 
which meant long shifts for carpenters and 
concrete workers. Those installing the windows 
and doors often had deliveries at the weekend, 
which meant they would be on-site then. Much 
of crane erector John Steeden’s work had to 
be done at the weekend:
Well, sometimes, they would only like us to 
work the weekends.  They would give us 
Saturday and Sunday, and expect it back 
working Monday, at the height, that we’d 
climbed it to. We’d have to put it up there, 
and test it of course. Every time you move it, 
you test it. We had to bring in test weights 
and an inspector or a man who’s qualified 
to test and pass over cranes.
But many of the other workers on the Barbican 
refused to do overtime, on a point of principle:
I never done it. In fact, I think I only worked 
overtime, in the whole of my lifetime, about 
once or twice. I always stuck by the rulebook.  
I always said that we fought for a 40 hour 
week and that’s what I’m going to work.…a 
lot of men were like that. They was principled 
in the sense that they weren’t going to do 
what the management wanted them to do. The 
management were always looking for people 
to work overtime and by doing that, you’re 
obviously cutting the rates of other people. 
Vic Heath 
Barbican tower under construction 
Source: Courtesy of Richard Organ.
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Barbican tower under construction 
Source: Courtesy of Richard Organ
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the turriff disPute, 1965
The Barbican was built at a time of change in 
the building industry, some of which impacted 
negatively on industrial relations. One such 
change was the sharp rise in labour-only 
sub-contracting and the attempts by building 
contractors to introduce more and more 
casual non-union labour onto major sites. This 
provoked a strike at the Turriff site in September 
1965, following the refusal of a small number 
of sub-contract carpenters to take part in a 
union card check. All 380 workers were 
promptly sacked, with the company announcing 
that they would be replaced by non-union 
labour. Turriff then proceeded to resurrect one 
of the most notorious practices of the building 
industry employers by insisting the new 
workers sign the ‘Document’, a declaration 
stating that they would never strike, ban over-
time or engage in a work-to-rule. 
15 For more on the ‘Document’, see Raymond Postgate (1923), 
   The Builders History, NFBTO, p88
16 Daily Worker, 2 October 1965. The four sites were: Laing’s 
   Paternoster site; Sunley’s, Horseferry Road; Higgs and Hill, 
   South Bank; and Wimpey’s Euston development. 
The ‘Document’ had first appeared during a 
strike in London in the 1830s and variations 
of it had been used from that point on by 
employers during strikes and lock-outs until the 
early decades of the twentieth century.15 Its 
re-appearance in the 1960s on one of the 
highest-profile sites in London clearly enraged 
building workers and set the scene for an 
extension of the dispute. Within a week over 
2,000 building workers, employed on four 
of the biggest sites in London, had struck 
in sympathy.16 Pickets were placed at the 
entrance to the site, preventing Turriff from 
sending in the replacement workers.17 Further 
pressure was added when a regional disputes 
commission, a type of arbitration board made 
up of employer and union representatives, 
found in favour of the workforce and instructed 
they be re-employed. However, Turriff project 
manager, John L. Justice, tried to tough it out, 
arguing that the company could not re-employ 
the sacked men as it had already recruited 
new workers.18
  
The situation turned violent at the beginning 
of October, when lorries trying to take in 
non-union labour were confronted by a large 
number of pickets and a hail of missiles. 
Vic Heath has vivid memories of this:
They brought non-union labour on, tried to 
bring it onto the site.  They brought this bus 
on, and there was hundreds of us, either side 
of the car park, quite a big car park, loads of 
the Old Bill, you know, and we pelted these 
coaches with rocks, you know, and every 
coach – every window in the coach was 
smashed to bits.  
17 Daily Worker, 29 September 1965
18 Construction News, 14 October 1966
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There was dents all over the coach and it 
really got a hammering, I’m not kidding 
you. The coach went in, and they got out, 
and unfortunately, the scabs, as you’d like 
to call them, they were all ex-Hungarian 
freedom fighters. Or quite a lot of them, and 
that wasn’t in very good taste either, and 
a number of us went on site, we knew how 
to get onto site and off again without being 
spotted basically, and we put the frighteners 
on these guys and told them that if they 
didn’t leave, they’d be the worst for it really, 
basically, it was our jobs and stuff like that. 
And they left, well some of them left, and 
they went off the site. 
The police came to see me, police inspector 
and some sergeant, and said to me “We 
know you’re responsible for this”. I said, 
“What are you going to charge me with – 
threatening behaviour or what?”  So they 
said, “Oh, you’re a regular barrack room 
lawyer, ain’t you, you know it all?!”  I said, 
“I don’t know it all, no,” I said, “but,” I said, 
“what are you going to charge me with?  I 
ain’t done anything! You can’t accuse me of 
doing anything. I haven’t touched anyone or 
anything like that.” But, obviously, it worked.  
I mean, there was a lot of us there and we 
worked together in conjunction with each 
other, and they left. 
Vic Heath
Protest march in support of Turriff workers, including Lou Lewis (far right), October 1965
Source: Courtesy of Vic Heath.
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Six pickets were arrested by police. Later that 
day, hundreds of workers from several large 
sites joined a march to the headquarters 
of the London Master Builders’ Federation, 
chanting slogans such as ‘scabs out’.19 In the 
aftermath of this, the London management 
committee of the Amalgamated Society of 
Woodworkers (ASW) met and urged the 
national leadership of the union to declare 
the strike official. The committee also met with 
30 shop stewards from sites all over London 
and agreed that the site be blacked until 
Turriff accepted the decision of the disputes 
commission.20 The arguments in favour of this 
were made clear: 
Behind this dispute is Turriff’s decision to 
bring in labour-only sub-contractors — groups 
of men without plant or materials — who 
contract to do the job at a specified price and 
are not party to trade union agreements...
trade union conditions go by the board as 
the gangs work round the clock to finish a 
particular job at piecework rates and then 
move onto another job.21 
Eventually, the various unions involved 
and the NFBTO declared the strike official. 
Turriff’s efforts to keep the site open with 
scab labour appeared even closer to failure, 
when, following a meeting with local district 
trade union officials and shop stewards, the 
replacement workers walked off the site. The 
pressure was kept up with a large march, 
involving several hundred building workers 
from various London sites, to Conway Hall, 
where a rally in support of the Barbican 
workers was held. With their position steadily 
weakening, Turriff changed tack, indicating 
that they might re-employ the sacked 
workers, but not the shop stewards. This 
was rejected by the unions, who continued 
to press Turriff to accept the decision of the 
disputes commission.22 Eventually, following 
a meeting between the company and union 
representatives, Turriff conceded defeat 
and offered to re-employ all sacked men. 
The ‘Document’ was withdrawn and it was 
accepted by Turriff that all employees must 
either be union members or be ‘willing to 
join one.’23
19 Daily Worker, 2 October 1965.
20 Daily Worker 4 October 1965
21 Ibid
22 Daily Worker, 9 October 1965
23 Daily Worker, 12 October 1965
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Bonus Payments
Another issue that caused severe problems 
for industrial relations on the Barbican was 
that of bonus payments. The basic pay for a 
building worker in the mid-1960s, working 
the 40 hour week, was lower than that of 
many other industrial workers. In fact, the 
building industry had moved from second 
place in the wage rates by industry in 1938 
to 12th place in 1963.24 Bonus or incentive 
payments had been part of the national 
working rule agreements since World War 
Two and were seen increasingly as a means 
by which a worker could earn a decent wage. 
On the Barbican, bonus payments made up 
a considerable percentage of all workers’ 
wages. Vic Heath was a scaffolder shop 
steward and chair of the works committee on 
the Turriff site. Along with health and safety 
considerations, negotiating bonus was an 
important duty of the site stewards: 
Well, the general sort of thing was to try 
and ensure that the lads were working in 
safe surroundings, and it was very difficult in 
them days because there was no real serious 
Health & Safety at Work Act at that time.  
You’d represent the lads if they didn’t get 
their bonus right or any sort of problems they 
had with management, you would go and 
represent the lads for almost virtually anything 
– protective clothing, canteen facilities, 
everything. When in most cases, you’d go in, 
as Federation steward, you’d go in with, say, 
a carpenters’ steward, because the carpenter 
obviously knew his trade, and he’d lay out the 
differentials and stuff like that, as far as the 
trade was concerned, and I’d back him, as 
the Federation steward, and that was the 
way usually. And usually, we didn’t meet 
management, as such, senior management. 
We usually met bonus clerks and stuff like 
that, so they’d argue, obviously, on behalf 
24 Jan Druker, (1980) ‘One Big Union: Structural Change in Building Trade Unionism’, PhD thesis, University of Warwick, p419
of the company, what sort of bonuses they 
thought, you could achieve, and we’d argue 
against that, saying that, that them targets are 
not realistic, and that’s the way it went, and 
generally speaking, from my point of view 
anyway, because I’d become quite good at 
negotiation with scaffolding in particular, we 
was usually the top earnings on most sites.
William Milne and his fellow carpenters 
installing the windows and doors were also 
among the top earners on the Barbican:
We could make a pound an hour bonus, three 
weeks’ wages, every week. It was like price-
work. In other words, you got so long to do 
that window, and all the things involved in it, 
and I found I could make a fortune at it, a few 
of us could. But there was a lot of them just 
wouldn’t bother trying.  But then there was a 
pooled bonus. If I recall rightly, the fall-back 
bonus was something like four and sixpence. 
So what would you be coming out with at the 
end of the week?
10 bob, that’s 4 quid a day isn’t it? Say six 
days, 24 quid and another two 24s on top 
of that. Of course you’re taxed then, heavier. 
Jim Moher also recalled the importance of 
bonus to his wage:
We would get a lesser bonus, but it would be 
linked to their [the bricklayers’] rate. 
Was the wage more than the £7 a week you 
were getting in Dublin?
Oh yeah!  We were up into…15…I would 
say…I made some money there.
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There were numerous different types of bonus 
systems. These could include site bonus 
systems, where all workers got an equal 
bonus, regardless of individual occupation 
or measured output; gang bonus, where all 
workers in a particular group, who worked 
together, would pool their bonus and share 
it equally; trade collective bonus, where all 
workers in a particular trade or occupation 
would share an equal bonus; individual 
bonus, where each worker would earn a 
bonus level based on a measurement or 
estimation of his output. Those building 
employers who operated recognised bonus 
systems tended to favour the site bonus least, 
as it reduced their control over the workforce 
and the labour process itself. Individual 
bonus systems offered the greatest degree 
of managerial control, as it undermined 
solidarity and collectivism amongst the 
workforce. On the Barbican, there were 
several different types of bonus system in 
operation, some of which could cause friction 
amongst the workers: 
I think I was on the third floor for Laing’s 
and then, this is where all the trouble started 
about bonuses, some of the workers was 
getting gang bonus. Then there was an 
argument over the gang bonus, because 
somebody else was getting the individual 
bonus. Then the union, you had the union 
meeting whenever they called it, which was 
regular. It was always about the bonus, 
bonus, bonus. And then, you might have a 
union meeting, say of a Tuesday, and then, 
Thursday, there was a safety meeting, a 
safety-first meeting.  So the meeting say was 
booked for an hour, but it never lasted an 
hour.  It lasted an hour and a quarter, an hour 
and a half. They’d stop you two hours off 
your money. You were paid by the hour then 
because there clock-in, clock-out. Then, if you, 
like say you put up a load of columns in the 
day, they’d start pouring concrete about four 
o’clock, so again, you got to acro it up and 
plumb them all up and then, and then they’d 
put the staging in, and there was a bloke up 
there in the crane would come around, and 
you were on stand-by then. Now, it might 
not finish pouring till about half-past five, 
six o’clock, but then, what you’d put up in the 
day time, you had the opportunity of staying 
back to plumb them up, check them to make 
sure that they were all plumb. They might 
need a tighten of the acro here and there. 
They might have got a knock with the bucket 
and knocked them out of plumb and things 
like that, but that’s what you were there for, 
and then, the row started there because, 
when you stayed back for plumbing up the 
shuttering and that, you might be there till 
eight o’clock, half-past eight, maybe nine 
o’clock of a night-time, with halogen lamps 
and everything like that. Then, when you got 
your bonus, your bonus was the same as the 
person that left at six o’clock, and then there 
was a row over that. And then they were 
onto the Federation steward as to why – he 
was supposed to be the daddy to solve all 
the problems as to why you were getting 
the same bonus as the other person. Then 
this other gang might be getting individual 
bonus, and you were getting gang bonus. 
The bonus clerk used to come around about 
Wednesday or something like that. It was 
always a week in hand with the bonus, or 
something like that, and then he’d put the 
word out. They’d say, “What’s the bonus 
this week?” and he’d, by the way, leak it, 
say, “Well, don’t say nothing to anybody 
else – your bonus is...” say it was £12 this 
week, as the gang bonus.  The individual 
bonus was about £18. That’s one against the 
other.  So, they’d get wind of that and, oh, 
the trouble there used to be!
Noel Clarke
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The type of situation outlined by carpenter 
Noel Clarke is one that trade union activists 
on the Barbican challenged. The Barbican 
shop stewards argued that individual bonuses 
were unfair, and, as can be seen with the 
examples quoted by Clarke, could often pit 
worker against worker. As an alternative, they 
proposed collective bonuses, where all workers 
in a particular trade or job would get the same 
bonus payment. Output would be measured, 
pooled, and divided equally among workers, 
irrespective of personal productivity. As Vic 
Heath showed, this was the system that the 
scaffolders on the Turriff site operated:
The scaffolders were one of the only sections 
on the Barbican that had a collective bonus 
scheme. So everybody in the scaffolders’ gang 
got the same bonus, say 15 pairs – that’s how 
you work it really. You work in pairs.…
Everybody’s total then got pooled together?
That’s right, and then …that’s split between all 
of you.
On the Barbican, bonus disputes were 
becoming more frequent. There were other 
problems. Myton appeared to be less and less 
tolerant of the activities of rank-and-file trade 
unionists. In May 1966, steelfixer Des Warren, 
who had been active in trade union struggles 
in the North-West, was sacked 25. Myton also 
canvassed the NFBTO, successfully, for the 
replacement of A. Dodd, from the Transport 
and General Workers Union (TGWU), as 
federation steward. Carpenter and ASW 
activist Rolph Langdon was sacked after four 
days, ostensibly because he was unsuitable. 
Following protests by shop stewards, Langdon 
was then offered a job on the site as a 
foreman. He refused this, but the fact that 
he had been offered such a post completely 
undermined Myton’s case that he was an 
unsuitable worker and the company was forced 
to re-employ him as a carpenter.26 Langdon 
soon became the federation steward. The 
workers continued to fight, in order to defend 
the principles of union organisation: 
Now, there was a crane driver on the site 
who wouldn’t join the union. He said he didn’t 
agree with the union in principle. So I said, 
fair enough, so I went up to the office. I said, 
“If this man isn’t removed by four o’clock, 
we’ll be removing ourselves.” I said, “We’ll 
be outside that gate tomorrow morning on 
picket. This is a closed shop. We can’t allow 
non-union members on the site.” So anyhow 
the management, Bill Pidgeon was his name, 
the foreman. Bill went down, got him up in 
the office and spoke to him, and eventually, 
he agreed to join the union. And Bill came to 
me and he said, “Well, he’s agreed to join 
the union.” “Well,” I said, “I wouldn’t want 
to come between the man and his principles, 
because, on principle, he’s against unions and 
he didn’t want to join the union.” So I said, 
“It still applies – either he’s off the site or we’re 
off the site.” So, he was off the site, obviously. 
So, you know, that was the kind of rigidity that 
prevailed at the time. We were determined. I 
mean, there’s no good having a man against 
his wishes on the job. We wanted people that 
was willing to be union members and that 
would support any action we took. 
Michael Houlihan
25 Michael Houlihan papers, Written Statement to Court 
   of Inquiry into the circumstances and causes of the dispute 
   at Messrs. Myton Ltd, for an on behalf of the trade union 
   members dismissed by Messrs Myton Limited on the 
   Barbican Development Scheme, City of London, 4 
   November 1966, p3. We are obliged to Michael Houlihan 
   for a copy of this statement.
26 Ibid, p2
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Lou Lewis (with loudspeaker) and other workers 
at a meeting on Barbican site. 
Source: Morning Star, 17 June 1966.
Myton made an attempt to bring in subcontract 
steelfixers, which led to a further deterioration 
in industrial relations on the site. Twelve 
steelfixers were sacked, with ten being 
reinstated a short time later. The problems 
on the site came to a head in the summer of 
1966. All workers on the Myton site withdrew 
from the various bonus schemes and were paid 
a reduced, standing rate of 3/- per hour for 
eight weeks, whilst negotiations took place for 
replacement schemes.   New schemes were 
eventually agreed, but problems remained. 
Lou Lewis attempted to introduce a collective 
bonus for carpenters, but this was rejected by 
Myton. Scaffolders also remained in conflict 
with the Myton management over bonus. The 
most common bonus system for scaffolders 
was one based on linear yards. It was easy 
to measure and easy to understand, for all 
parties. This was the system in operation on 
the Turriff site. However, Myton used a different 
system, which was complicated and difficult 
to operate. According to the scaffolder shop 
steward, Michael Houlihan, it was a system that 
operated solely in the interests of management:
Well, we had a very complicated and to 
the uninitiated it was an unworkable kind 
of a system. Well, it was workable for the 
management because it was so complicated 
that they could interpret the targets as they 
wished, and which they did, and which I put 
a stop to eventually. Each item had a different 
target. You had to reach a certain target, and 
then there was a saving rate, say, of 50 per 
cent. You had to complete so much work in an 
hour, and then, if you completed that and if you 
doubled that, you’d get your basic rate plus 
50 per cent bonus. Now, nobody previously 
had been able to work out the amount that 
was required and whatever, and when the 
bonus was posted, every Thursday or Friday or 
whatever the day was, they’d just accept it. But 
when I started on the job, I asked the foreman 
to give me a copy of the work he submitted. 
I took it home, over the weekend, and I spent 
the whole weekend calculating the values of 
each task, and its monetary value. So when 
the bonus was posted on the following week, 
I went in and I challenged the bonus clerk 
to substantiate the figure he’d come up with, 
So, he went through it, blah, blah, blah, oh, 
he’d say he’d made a mistake – it was a few 
pence more. Well, I said, I’m afraid I’ll have 
to ask you to go through this again because 
my figures here, which I think are correct, I 
said we’ll compare each item, and it took us 
an enormous amount of time to do this, and the 
old foreman, the scaffolder foreman was quite 
alarmed as well because he’d given me the 
copy of the figures he was a little bit frightened 
about losing his job, etc. as you can imagine. 
But anyhow after long comparisons were made 
my figures proved to be the correct ones, and 
the bonus clerk admitted that they were.  
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But following that then, of course, the 
repercussions of that were that the foreman’s 
submissions were challenged in many ways, 
measures were taken and he was much more 
active in coming out on the site, but as a result 
of this, and as a result of harassment, which it 
amounted to, we went on a work-to-rule.
Failure to resolve the scaffolders’ bonus dispute 
led to a work-to-rule being initiated, involving 
all Myton workers on the site. Myton finally 
agreed to a new bonus scheme based on 
linear yards. But the company’s refusal to 
draw up a preamble to the scheme, led to 
a further deterioration in the situation:
Ultimately, we came to an agreement on 
the bonus scheme. Then, it was at this stage 
that …they thought that was it. No, I said, 
we’ll have to have a preamble to this. Of 
course, then, it was uproar, you know, on the 
management side, and they thought I was 
being bloody-minded. I tried to explain to him 
that the scheme was…not worth the paper 
it was written on unless we had these other 
things.  If you’ve seven scaffolders standing 
because they were incompetent enough not 
to supply the material to do the work with, 
then we wanted a pro rata bonus during 
that.  We didn’t want to be losing out as a 
result of their inefficiencies.  And, of course 
they’d never come across this before, and 
they were ill-equipped to deal with this kind of 
a situation. I particularly was branded as all 
sorts of troublemaker and all the rest of it, but 
I mean, I thought I was being quite reasonable 
and I thought any reasonable person would 
admit that to be the case.  But, unfortunately, 
for them, in their lack of understanding and 
their lack of knowledge about this situation, 
they didn’t have any real personnel person 
there who would sit down and talk these 
things through, agree on their legitimacy or 
otherwise, and this was part of the thing that 
led to…the eventual lockout. 
Myton’s response to the work-to-rule was the 
sacking of three steelfixers. This led to a walkout 
of the entire workforce. Following meetings 
with trade union officials, the workers agreed 
to return. However, as Michael Houlihan points 
out, the company decided upon a lock-out 
and entire shut-down of the site. The timing of 
the shut-down seemed strange, given that the 
workers had been on strike for just a couple 
of days and had agreed to return. However, 
Myton was experiencing quite severe technical 
and financial difficulties on the Barbican and, 
as we shall see below, some months later, the 
company would claim that contradictory and 
late instructions from the architects had caused 
serious problems, and that the designs were 
more complex than the outline drawings had 
appeared when the tenders were placed. Some 
among the Myton workforce felt that they were 
being used to deflect attention away from the 
real source of the problems the company was 
facing on this contract:
But their architects at the time...there were 
many changes being done. The architects had 
submitted their drawings, etc. etc. but, as you 
will appreciate, things required changing, 
because of circumstances.  Architects had to be 
on top of things all the time. But the architects, 
apparently, were six weeks behind with their 
drawings, which meant that they would be 
paying a labour force on the job, and the job 
wouldn’t be progressing as intended.  But we 
discovered that at a later stage, that what they 
wanted was lock us out for six weeks, allow 
the architects to come up to speed with their 
presentation of the drawings, get rid of the 
so-called troublemakers, myself included, and 
everything will be hunky-dory.  But, the thing 
was, they didn’t anticipate the feeling among 
the workers who had been dismissed that they 
would continue not only for six weeks but for six 
months and a year and up to 14 months later 
were still out on the road and nothing, not a 
brick was laid on a brick. Michael Houlihan
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the myton lock out
As Michael Houlihan pointed out, this lock-
out would continue for over a year, making 
it one of the longest-running and protracted 
labour disputes in British industrial history. 
Myton soon made it clear that it was willing 
to re-open the site and re-employ the workers, 
on the basis that the six works committee 
members be excluded and remained sacked. 
This was not acceptable to the Myton workers 
and the site remained shut. A key figure in 
this dispute was the late Lou Lewis. Originally 
from Liverpool, the twenty-eight year old 
carpenter was a member of the ASW but 
also a leading light in the Communist Party 
of Great Britain (CPGB). Lewis started on the 
Myton site in the spring of 1966, following 
a three-year stint on the nearby Paternoster 
development, and was soon elected as both 
the ASW and NFBTO steward, replacing 
Langdon. The question of how Lewis, by this 
stage a well-known site activist, managed to 
get a start on this site was one that puzzled 
Vic Heath:
When the Myton site started, Ralph Langdon 
was the Federation steward.  Lou was still 
working at Paternoster.  Lou finished at 
Paternoster and he came round and got a job 
on the Myton site. Why they didn’t operate 
the blacklist at that time, or why he wasn’t 
caught in the net, I don’t know, but he started 
work on the site. 
Tony McGing reckons he knows the answer 
to this puzzle, contending that Lewis entered 
the site disguised as an elderly worker, and 
remained like this for a week, taking him past 
the point where he could be dismissed by 
Myton:
Everybody felt so sorry for Lou, this poor 
little man coming along – “Give him a hand 
with his tools!”  You know, little white coat.  
I was driving the crane just right inside the 
gate, and they said, “Do you know who’s 
just gone down there?!  Lou!” But they kept 
it quiet, you see. And he’d sort of limp. The 
guy in the labour office took all his details 
and everything, but because he was known 
as a different name, I can’t remember what it 
was, but his name was Lou Lewis, but that’s 
not what he was known as in the union. They 
were all waiting for him to come along. Of 
course, he came in there and slipped right 
through. “Give him a hand with his case…!”  
Down through the mucky sites and up onto 
the building, working away with his hammers 
and tools for about…I think it was six or 
seven days. You’ve got to be on site I think for 
a certain time.
Leaflet produced by Myton strike committee in March 1967 
Source: Courtesy of Vic Heath
34
The dispute was officially supported, for 
a short period, by two of the three unions 
involved—the TGWU and the Amalgamated 
Union of Building Trade Workers (AUBTW)—
mainly through the efforts of the local district 
organisers, who had the authority to declare 
strikes official. By early November, however, 
the national leaderships of both of these 
unions had intervened and withdrew this 
endorsement. The ASW, more centralised, 
did not support the strike at any point. This 
lack of official union support cut the Myton 
workers adrift and shaped the tactics they 
would use to win the struggle:
Our little group of stewards had a meeting, 
and we decided that we’d just have a 
skeleton picket, allow all those other men 
to go off and find other works, because 
there were a lot of family men and they just 
couldn’t possibly exist.  Now, if we kept 
it down to a small number, we could then 
say, well, lads, if you get work, make a little 
donation or whatever, we’ll go to other sites, 
and we’ll get funds from there, union branches, 
etc. Well, Lou and I and anyone capable of 
speaking, of putting our case to other workers 
in canteens, and especially those that were, 
semi-unionised, we gave a spiel there and 
asked for their support, and if there were 
stewards on the job, we asked them to put the 
hat out on a Thursday evening, when they got 
paid. In that way, we got a good degree of 
financial support.
Did you get support from other parts of 
the country?
Oh yeah, all over, union branches, –  the Post 
Office Workers Union, the Dockers… They all 
helped us financially. 
Michael Houlihan
Picket on Myton site 
Source: Morning Star, 21 February 1967.
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Lack of official support from the trade union 
leaders quickly turned into outright opposition, 
and even collaboration with employers 
against the workers. In February 1967, the 
union leaders and the employers agreed a 
settlement to the dispute that would see the site 
opened and the workforce re-employed, minus 
the six works committee members. This was 
rejected by the Myton workforce but between 
February and April the company tried, with 
union leadership blessing, on three occasions 
to re-open the site with a scab workforce. On 
each occasion, a mass picket was called of 
all the sacked workers and the workers on the 
other two Barbican sites. Vic Heath recalled 
one of these occasions:
When the company tried to bring scab labour 
in, on Myton’s site, we stopped the Barbican, 
we stopped on our side of the road, and 
Laing’s as well, and we all went over to the 
Myton site. It was a comparatively small site, 
and so you can reckon there were about 700 
or 800 men on the other side of the road 
when the scabs tried to drive in the coaches.  
Although the Old Bill was in large numbers, 
they weren’t in large enough numbers to control 
us! And all the lads all sort of surged forward 
and then, all of a sudden, one of the blokes, 
who I can remember him to this day, to look at 
him, can’t remember his name, he run out into 
the road and laid down in front of the coach.  
So the coach driver had to stop, which is the 
most, the worst place in the world to stop, and 
all the crowd surged forward and they was 
rocking the coach backwards and forwards.  
All the guys that was in the coach was getting 
out and running away, you know! So the site 
never started.  And everybody was cheering 
this guy, and he just got up and walked away.
Richard Organ also recalled these attempts 
to break the strike, and the response by the 
workers on the other Barbican sites:
Well you know, Myton’s tried to bring in what 
we say is scab labour, and the word got 
about. I didn’t quite agree with what some of 
the lads done, but, from the tower block that 
I worked on, they would lob bits of masonry, 
parts of bricks and what have you, down 
onto the site, and you’d see these, you know, 
workers running off it. But there was a few 
occasions when …they were trying to bus in 
people, and we got the word, and basically 
we downed tools and went over and picketed 
the gates to stop, you know, bussing in scab 
labour. You might be there like half a day and 
they’d try to get…the police would be there, 
and they could see there was a mass picket, 
and they’d just turn away and off they’d go, 
and then we’d go back into work, after lunch 
or something.
The site was also visited by NFBTO general 
secretary Harry Weaver and its London 
regional secretary, Len Eaton. At these 
meetings, both men urged the workforce to 
return to work, but failed to find any support. 
On one occasion, the pair were barracked 
and jeered, and had mud thrown at them, 
before they bade a hasty retreat. The Myton 
workforce was clearly behind the works 
committee leaders, but the hostility of the 
trade union leaders would worsen and would 
have a significant bearing on the eventual 
outcome of the dispute.
Regional and national disputes commissions 
were held, but failed to find a solution. At 
the national meeting held on 7 March 1967, 
Myton, the three unions involved, and the 
strike committee all gave evidence.
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Myton pinned the blame for the strike firmly 
on the shoulders of the strike committee and 
justified its decision not to re-employ them. They 
had, it was claimed, taken part in ‘unofficial 
picketing’ engaged in ‘intimidating’ behaviour 
and ‘repeatedly brought the constitutional 
machinery of the industry into contempt’.28 
Represented in the main by divisional or 
local officials, most of whom were to varying 
degrees sympathetic to the strike, the three 
unions rejected Myton’s arguments. The TGWU 
claimed that the sacking of the three steelfixers 
was a move designed to frighten the rest of 
the workforce and weaken their organisation. 
The transport union also focused on the earlier 
attempt by Myton to introduce subcontract 
scaffolders onto the Barbican as a further 
example of the firm’s ‘provocative’ behaviour.29 
28 National Archives, (NA) LAB 10/2960, Record of Proceedings 




The AUBTW took up the question of the alleged 
disruptiveness of the stewards, arguing that its 
main steward on the site, Michael Houlihan, 
had been accredited since January 1966, with 
no complaints or problems. According to the 
union, the real problem was the decision by 
Myton to impose an inadequate bonus scheme 
on the scaffolders.30 The ASW dismissed 
Myton’s attitude towards labour relations as 
pitiable, pointing out how the firm had not 
appointed a labour relations officer until just 
before the strike had started and criticising its 
alleged intransigence.31  However, the decision 
of the panel was one that broadly accepted 
Headline. Source: Daily Mail, 22 February 1967
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Pickets at Myton site, including: Michael Houlihan (far left), Rolph Langdon (second from left), and Lou Lewis, (second from right)
Source: Morning Star, 31 March 1967.
Myton’s case. It ruled that the six strike leaders 
had acted ‘contrary’ to the building industry 
National Joint Council regulations and had 
also ‘defied’ their own organisations by 
continuing to picket the site after a deal to re-
open it had been made. As a result, there was 
‘no possibility of reasonable labour relations’ 
on the site if they were to be re-employed. The 
recommendation was that the site be reopened 
on the basis of the 15 February agreement 
and that the six were to remain sacked.32 In 
response, the Myton workforce continued to 
support the picket, and turned up en-masse 
whenever the company tried to introduce a 
scab labour force. 
Tapping into the saloon bar narratives 
concerning the causes of industrial relations 
problems generally in this era, the press also 
condemned the strike and began to vilify the 
works committee. The London Evening News 
ran a series of articles on the strike, blaming 
it on a small group of communist agitators 
who had ‘infiltrated’ the sites,33 whilst the 
Daily Mail published a full-page article on 
Lou Lewis, complete with photograph, under 
the headline ‘This smiling man, who halts the 
building of a village within the city’.34 The 
remaining five committee members, Mick 
Houlihan, Chris Taylor, Rolph Langdon, Kevin 
Synott (a strong catholic and not sympathetic 
at all to communism) and Chris Noble were 
also named and blamed for causing the strike. 
Attention began to focus on the London Joint 
Sites Committee, which was an important 
network of stewards that had been established 
during the Turriff strike but which, the media 
claimed, had been set up by communists as a 
means purely of provoking mayhem on sites all 
over the capital. The committee was described 
as a ‘mysterious, shapeless organisation’, with 
a secret leadership, the aims of which were 
‘to usurp the authority of the trade unions; to 
undermine the government’s economic policy; 
and to re-kindle left-wing attitudes towards 
employers’.35 Displaying the hostility and 
unease felt among the trade union leaders 
for such rank-and-file bodies, ASW leader 
George Smith, described the committee as no 
more than a ‘front’ for ‘amateur’ politicians, 
but a dangerous  and ‘serious problem for the 
amount of trouble it can cause’.36  
32 Ibid
33 See, for example, Evening News, 1 March 1967
34 Daily Mail, 22 February 1967
35 Evening News, 1 March 1967
36 Ibid
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Those who were actually part of the London 
Joint Sites Committee had a completely 
different take on it. To them, its main purpose 
was simply to improve and strengthen trade 
union organisation and solidarity on the sites:
There was a feeling that sites should really 
be organised basically before they started or 
that when a site started, that union members 
would be allowed to go on it and organise it, 
because most times, you would have to kind 
of creep in under the radar, work on that, for 
that company or that site for a period of time, 
before you could start organising it, because 
I think… I can’t quite remember, but you had 
kind of a probationary period. So, if you 
went in there, and on the first week, you tried 
to get people to join the union and all that, 
they could just sack you, and say, right your 
work’s not up to standard or what have you, 
and get you off the site. You know, most of the 
employers in the building trade did not want 
organised sites. 
Richard Organ
Well, the Joint Sites was set up as a solidarity 
organisation, basically.  Wherever there was 
industrial action on any of the sites in the 
London region, we’d offer our assistance, in 
most cases.  If it was an organised site or not, 
we’d go over and we’d offer our assistance, 
if they needed help, you know, raising money 
for strikes and stuff like that, and basically, 
that’s what the Joint Sites was about…we 
weren’t going round setting people up or 
anything like that. 
Vic Heath
At the end of the day, you can have all the 
troublemakers you like, but if they don’t get the 
support from the rest of the employees on the 
job, they’re on their own, and if they’re these 
madmen, as somebody described them…They 
wouldn’t last and nobody would follow them. 
It’s only when you have reasonable, legitimate 
grievances which you want addressed, and 
go about in the way that…then, you’ll get the 
support...Men aren’t bloody sheep…! 
Michael Houlihan
The Myton workers received a great deal 
of backing, not only from other sites and 
building union branches, but workers in other 
industries. It was support which meant a lot to 
the men on strike:
Well, I remember…a little incident. I went 
outside my door on Christmas Eve, and 
there was a case of spirits, mixed – brandy, 
whisky, rum, etc. from the Dockers, from the 
local Dockers branch, and I thought that’s 
what kept us going for so long. You couldn’t 
possibly go on for the length of time we did 
without… I mean, the hostility of the press, 
you expect, and the Dockers had been 
subjected to that as well, so they knew. If we 
weren’t being subjected to that, they’d have 
said there’s something wrong here. I mean, 
these are our sworn enemies and the more 
this hostility by the press, by the right-wing 
press, and even the Daily Mirror was part of 
it and to a lesser extent, the Guardian, but we 
didn’t get any…real support from any paper.  
Well, of course, the Morning Star, they gave 
us space to present our side of the argument 
as well, so we appreciated that.
Michael Houlihan
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Mass picket at Myton site, following attempt to break strike. 
Source: Morning Star, 4 April 1967
37 Financial Times, 8 June 1967; Morning Star 13 June 1967
38 Avery said this under cross examination from both Les Kemp 
   of the TGWU and Bill Lewis of the AUBTW at the Cameron 
   inquiry in June 1967. For more on this see the Financial 
   Times, 8 June 1967. Hugh Cassidy also wrote a series 
   of detailed articles on the Horseferry Road lock-out, which 
   repeated the allegations about Mills. See the Building 
   Workers Charter, Volume 1, nos. 3, 4 and 5, 1970.
the court of inquiry
With little prospect of a settlement of the 
dispute, the government decided to act. A 
Court of Inquiry, convened under the auspices 
of the Industrial Courts Act, was set up, charged 
with the responsibility of investigating the 
background to the strike and formulating 
recommendations for its solution. The lock-
out at the new government buildings site on 
nearby Horseferry Road was also subject to 
investigation by this court. That particular 
dispute had started around the same time as 
the Myton strike, following a conflict between 
contractor, Bernard Sunley and Sons, and 
shop stewards on the site. Like the Barbican 
site, there had been a whole succession of 
small disputes, on issues relating to bonus, 
site organisation and victimisation, before 
a major confrontation blew up. Sunley’s 
attempt to have workers clocking on to the 
site, along with its determination to end a 
collective bonus scheme in operation on the 
pre-cast concrete yard, was the final flash-point 
for a major show-down and the sacking 
of the entire workforce.  
It was later alleged by Sunley that the NFBTO 
President, James Mills, had met with the firm 
on 17 October 1966 and indicated that 
these terms be presented to the men, in order 
to provoke a strike deliberately. This would 
then provide the grounds for the sacking of 
the works committee, which was led by two 
well-known activists, Hugh Cassidy and Jack 
Henry, who, according to this view of events, 
Mills presumably also wanted to be rid of. 
Mills allegedly assured Sunley and Sons that, 
if the case went to a disputes commission, 
there was a fair chance that he would be 
on the panel and would ensure that the 
firm would obtain a favourable outcome.37 
These were shocking allegations, which 
Mills later denied. Unusually, there were no 
minutes taken at the meeting, which makes it 
difficult to verify what did actually happen. 
But what cannot be doubted, and what was 
later admitted by Sunley and Sons director, 
George Avery, is that the company, one year 
behind on the completion date, and facing 
a penalty cost of around £180,000, as well 
as a doubling of its estimated wage bill, from 
£700,000 to £1.4 million, did provoke strike 
action at Horseferry Road in an attempt not 
only to provide a fig leaf for the sacking of 
the works committee but also to provide the 
grounds for a possible termination of the 
contract altogether.38 The inquiry into the 
Barbican and Horseferry Road disputes took 
place in June 1967. But it was one to which 
the works committee itself had not been invited:
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When the Cameron Inquiry was mooted and 
it was going to be set up and all those who 
were submitting evidence to the Cameron, we 
were not included. We were the main people 
who should have been asked to give our 
evidence on why we did what we did. And 
yet, it was the unions, the management and 
so on. So I wrote to the Inquiry Chairman, 
or Secretary, and asked that we be allowed. 
Now, I think it was two days or three days 
prior to that that the letter came to my house. 
I happened to be at a trade union conference 
down in Paignton in Devon. So I got a phone 
call, I had to come back home, I stayed up 
all night, on an old typewriter, to put our 
side…I think it was about seven o’clock at 
night I started, and I finished at half-past 11 
the following day. I had to have that down 
at Clapham or somewhere like that by four 
o’clock. That was the cut-off point. I got on the 
tube and went and handed it in, physically.
Michael Houlihan
At the hearings, the scale and nature of Myton’s 
difficulties on the Barbican were soon aired 
publicly for the first time. In an echo of 
the arguments made by the workers on site, 
Myton claimed that the construction designs 
were more complex in reality than they had 
appeared on the outline architects drawings 
upon which they had based their initial tender. 
These drawings had to be revised and far 
greater detail inserted. In his interview, Richard 
Organ alluded to this, pointing out how the 
initial drawings often had to be changed, in 
line with the work that was actually 
being done: 
We plumbed in the first floor, and that would 
be working off drawings and always the 
pipework doesn’t go in quite as it should 
do because there’s been some problem that 
hasn’t been foreseen. So, you’re going to run 
a pipe along a wall, and then you find there’s 
Lou Lewis and Rolph Langdon (right; second right) and supporters on their way to ASW disciplinary meeting, where the two were 
expelled from the union. Michael Houlihan is also in picture. Source: Morning Star, 4 May 1967.
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something in your way, you can’t quite do 
it, though it says on the drawing you should 
be able to do it, so you have to adapt.  So 
once we [set up] the first floor and sorted out 
all the problems, then all the floors after were 
all partitioned,  the same, and so you could 
just, you know, set up your pipework and  in 
it would go… as I say, when we’d done the 
first floor, and there was some alterations to 
the way the plumbing had been shown on 
the drawings, then the architects would come 
in and have a look, and then redo it, to how 
we’d installed it.
In addition, contradictory and late instructions 
and numerous changes to the designs had 
also been passed down from the architects, 
disrupting the work programme considerably.  
This had often resulted in completed work 
being taken down and replaced. The 
implications of this for industrial relations on 
the site were obvious: if the pace of work was 
slowed up as a result of these delays, then 
the workers’ bonus levels would be affected. 
The three architects disputed that they were 
to any degree responsible for the mess at the 
Barbican, but the argument being made here 
by Myton was similar to that outlined by John 
Justice just a couple of months earlier. Justice 
by this stage had left the Turriff site, but, in an 
interview with Construction News, he pointed 
out that, whilst the company’s original tender 
had been based on a provisional Bill of 
Quantities and just fifty or sixty drawings, 
they now had to deal with thousands of 
drawings from the architects and a continuous 
procession of building instructions.40 Justice 
highlighted the complexity of the building 
process when he pointed out that there were 
tolerances of just one-eighth of an inch on 
walls 30 feet in length and that, as the door 
frames were all pre-made with no architraves 
around them, there were no tolerances at all 
on them. Window frames were also said to 
have ‘very small’ tolerances.41 Turriff by this 
stage had been on the Barbican for three 
years, but was only half-way through the 
work of a contract that was supposed to be 
finished the following year. It also emerged 
that Laing were already 30 weeks behind on 
its phase 3 contract and that the Myton site, 
in the 18 months or so that it had been in 
operation, had only just begun erecting 
the superstructure.
The analysis offered in 2011 by former 
quantity surveyor Geoff Trickey on the 
difficulties that accompanied the construction 
of phase V might also be applied in part to 
the earlier phases of the development that 
were struggling in the 1960s: 
If you go into the Arts Centre, at a lowish 
level, and get into a lift, and there’s a button 
in the concrete, and the button is that shape, 
isn’t it, as everything – not everything, but 
lots of things in the Barbican are that shape…
those arches between what I used to call 
Block 13 and the button for the lift. Now, that 
button goes into a concrete structure which 
is built from day one, and somebody’s got to 
know where the lift button goes?! That’s what 
people totally mistook in those days about 
building concrete – building structures that 
were self-finished, because the whole process 
of the industry up to that time was you’d 
throw something up and you’d cover it with 
plaster or with some facing or, in the case of 
brickwork of course, it is its own facing, but if 
you’re pouring concrete and you’re not going 
to cover it up, because Chamberlin, Powell...
felt, if you’re building in concrete, it’s got to 
look like concrete, and I can understand that, 
but they didn’t understand the implications of 
40 Construction News, 27 April 1967
41 Ibid
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that, because the building industry, you know, 
isn’t geared up to acting like a brain surgeon 
on a building site. So, if you’re going to 
build something where you need to know the 
shape and size of the lift button before you 
can put in the ground floor--- normally, you’d 
just leave a chase --- [it’s a] totally different 
approach to building!
However, the Cameron team, which included 
shipbuilding and engineering union leader 
Danny McGarvey, appeared to take none 
of the more fundamental factors into account 
when issuing its report on the dispute two 
months later. Instead the blame was placed 
at the door of the works committee. Finding 
that there was no good reason for such a 
body to exist, Cameron concluded that it 
was both ‘mischievous and subversive not 
only of good labour relations on the sites in 
question, but of the authority and influence 
of the unions concerned’.42 The two major 
concerns to Cameron were the ‘degree 
of ignorance which apparently obtained 
amongst union officials as to what in fact 
was occurring on these sites’ and ‘the extent 
to which power and real authority had 
passed into the hands of the shop stewards 
and the works committees without effective 
union control’. The report recommended that 
the NFBTO and the National Federation of 
Building Trade Employers (NFBTE) alter the 
National Working Rule Agreement regarding 
election of the works committees and the 
federation stewards. The NFBTO in particular 
was advised to take greater control of the 
electoral process and to initiate regulations 
that would make it more difficult for a rank-
and-file body to hold a position of power. 
This included a greater willingness on the 
part of the NFBTO to prevent and disqualify 
from holding office those who had breached 
the working rule agreement. 
It was suggested that new works committee 
be appointed by union leaders at the Myton 
site, pending new elections, which would be 
under NFBTO supervision. Minutes of works 
committee meetings were to be supplied 
under penalty to the NFBTO regional 
secretary within 48 hours. The powers of 
shop stewards were also to be limited and 
laid out more clearly. Finally, the refusal of 
Myton to re-employ the six works committee 
members was endorsed by Cameron and a 
recommendation was made that the site be 
opened inside four weeks.
The outcome of the Cameron Report came as 
no surprise to the Barbican workers:
We knew, you’ve only got to look at previous 
situations. I don’t think there was an exact 
precedent for our situation, but you’ve only 
got to look  – these people can make blue 
seem red if they want to do it, by their verbal 
abilities and you’re on a hiding to nothing 
when you go in front of these people! Their 
minds are made up. It’s just a question of 
justification – they justify what they’re doing 
and the previous actions make them all seem 
legitimate to the public. The newspapers, of 
course, will then support that position, the 
noble lord and the whatever. It’s the great 




But, although rejected by the workforce, 
the Cameron Report can be seen as the 
beginning of the end of the dispute. It paved 
the way for an even closer collaboration 
between employers and trade union leaders. 
This eventually took the form of a remarkable 
full-page advertisement, published in several 
national newspapers, signed by the leaders 
of the three unions involved, along with 
the NFBTO and NFBTE leaders, which 
denounced the strike and the strike leaders. 
The advertisement stated that there ‘was 
no strike’ at the Barbican, that agreements 
between management and the unions on 
all outstanding issues had been reached, 
that the site was open, and that trade union 
members were free to work there with the 
support of their organisations. The pickets 
were condemned as a ‘few unrepresentative 
individuals’ whose actions were ‘disgraceful’ 
and whose real agenda was the ‘undermining 
of the authority of the properly-elected trade 
union representatives’.43 A couple of weeks 
before this both Harry Weaver and Len Eaton 
had been ejected from the Turriff and Laing 
sites following their attempts to persuade the 
workers there to accept the Cameron Report.   
44 On 16 October, a major effort was made 
to re-open the site, and was accompanied 
with a huge police presence, in order to 
protect strike-breakers. Violence erupted and 
saw many workers beaten and arrested by 
police,45 with one, a young plumber named 
David Leadbetter, allegedly suffering a 
broken arm in the back of a police van.46  
43 See for example the Evening News, 26 October 1967
44 Construction News, 12 October 1967
45 Morning Star, 17 October 1967
46 Barbican: Police Go Berserk , Advance News Bureau 
   and the Irish Internationalists leaflet , October 1967
  
Front page. Source: Morning Star, 17 October 1967.
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The strike leaders attempted to struggle on and 
called a protest march for 2 November, which 
was the day that the 24 pickets who had 
been arrested were due to appear in court. 
However, this would prove to be something 
of an anti-climax. Around 500 workers and 
supporters turned up, including two coach 
loads of building workers from Liverpool and 
Manchester. The demonstration was held in 
the pouring rain, but the main development 
that dampened the spirits of the men was the 
unexpected announcement by Lewis that the 
picketing of the site was going to end and that 
the dispute was effectively over. In his speech, 
Lewis said they had achieved as much as was 
possible against the combined forces of the 
employers, trade union leaders, police and 
government. He argued that support for the 
strike had not waned and that the ‘connivance 
and collaboration’ of the union leaders with 
the employers had not broken the resolve or 
the determination of the workers. Taking aim at 
the union leaders, Lewis argued that their true 
character and role in the dispute had been 
‘exposed’, and that it was a leadership that 
must be ‘destroyed’. 
Michael Houlihan regarded the union leadership 
collaboration with employers during this dispute 
as ‘the most blatant sell-out imaginable’ 47 but 
agreed with the decision to end the picket, as 
did all of the works committee members. He 
felt that no more could be achieved by 
continuing it. 
The hostility was of such a nature that it 
was affecting our families.  It was affecting 
everybody, and we just had to say, ‘well look, 
we’ll go out of here as dignified as we started.  
We’ll go out with our heads held high’. We 
fought the good fight, and because the forces 
arraigned against us were of such, you know, 
power and influence, that we just couldn’t 
withstand it, I mean, anymore.
47 Michael Houlihan papers, Letter by Michael Houlihan to 
   AUBTW executive, (n.d., 1967?). We are grateful to 
   Michael Houlihan for a copy of this letter.
Mass meeting at Barbican, following police violence of previous day. Source: Morning Star, 18 October 1967
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Leaflet for 2 November march
Source: Courtesy of Vic Heath
THE BLACKLIST
Myton’s Barbican site re-opened fully in 
November 1967. But the six stewards who 
led the struggle remained sacked. In the short 
term, the outcome of the dispute strengthened 
the hand of both the employers and the 
trade union leaders. Sir Frank Taylor and 
Barton Higgs, the managing directors of 
Taylor Woodrow and its subsidiary Myton, 
respectively, had both attended the march 
held on 2 November, where they had been 
jeered and challenged by workers. Interviewed 
later that day, they declared that none of the 
six would ever work for Taylor Woodrow 
again, on any site. This public blacklisting, a 
statement made all the more remarkable given 
that Taylor Woodrow was regularly awarded 
publicly funded contracts, was repeated by 
most of the large firms in the industry, making it 
exceptionally difficult for the sacked men 
– and many others who were associated with 
the dispute – to gain employment. In January 
1968, Lewis was hired and then quickly fired, 
once his identity became known, from the £5 
million Isleworth tower block development 
site in London 48. The same month, Rolph 
Langdon was also sacked shortly after starting 
on the building of a swimming pool in Tower 
Hamlets.49 Michael Houlihan was unemployed 
for around two years following the Myton 
strike. He recalls the clerk at Poplar labour 
48 Morning Star, 25 January 1968
49 Morning Star, 12 January 1968
Final rally on 2 November. 
Source: Morning Star, 3 November 1967
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exchange phoning dozens of scaffolding 
firms on his behalf, but being unable to find 
anyone willing to hire him: 
He phoned this firm, that firm. He phoned 
Taylor Woodrow and they said quite openly 
“Not only will we not employ Mr Houlihan in 
London, but nowhere in the United Kingdom”.
Sackings of prominent trade unionists also 
took place, with union approval, from the 
Brunel University site.50 Meanwhile, on the 
Barbican, the federation steward on the 
Turriff site, Max Beyer, and the chairman of 
the works committee, Vic Heath, also had 
their credentials withdrawn by the unions, 
following their involvement in picketing of 
the Myton site. When he left the Turriff site in 
1968, Vic Heath would find it very difficult to 
get any kind of work in the building industry. 
When he did so, he had to rely on the 
solidarity and support of his fellow workers to 
keep him there:
I worked on Leadenhall Street. I’d got a job 
on there as a result of an Irish guy I used 
to know. He got me a job on there, and 
the management found out who I was in a 
very short period of time and tried to sack 
me, and the site struck and it went on strike.  
Taylor Woodrow’s was the company, and the 
site went on strike for…two or three days, 
and all went back to normal, and I was the 
scaffolders’ steward as soon as I walked 
on-site basically and also the chairman of 
the works committee, and Jim was the… 
Federation steward. Callaghan I think his 
name was. 
Vic found that even a change of industry did 
not prevent attempts to blacklist him:
I ended up going to work for London Transport, 
first to Acton Works. The convener at Acton 
Works was a bloke named Don Cook, who 
was quite famous in his own right in later 
years. He led the rent strikes in Camden. He 
was the convener at Acton Works, and he 
was also a Party member of course. I went 
up there for a job, and they give you a lot of 
tests – eyesight, for obvious reasons, working 
on the line, and hearing – you’ve actually got 
to hear the train coming – and they asked me 
a lot of questions and stuff like that. First, they 
weren’t going to allow me to start because 
the blacklist, and…Don said, well, you know, 
“If you can’t give me a legitimate reason why 
he can’t start work here, I’ll stop the Works,” 
Acton Works, which was a big place! It was 
fantastic. So, they just let me start, and I 
started work – …I worked in the blacksmith’s 
shop for a while, and …then…they asked me 
to be the NUR steward, so I was holding a 
dual card. I’d still got my own card.   
Work resumed at the Myton site in November 
1967, but the situation was far from normal. 
William Milne started on the site at this point, 
and recalls a heavy police presence on 
the site.
Myton’s, when I arrived there, they’d just went 
back to work after 15 months’ strike...I was 
quite amazed to see a stationary policeman 
about every 20 yards around the site...And 
mounted police as well, circling the site.
50 The Times, 21 October 1967. Mick McGowan, the NFBTO 
   steward, being one such example
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The deeper problems regarding the tendering, 
design and organisation of the building 
process, which had been noted by the 
Cameron commission but played no part in 
their report, continued to dog progress. In 
1968, Myton threatened to leave the Barbican 
if more money from the City of London was 
not forthcoming. Again, the workers on the 
site were used as pawns by the company and 
redundancy notices were handed out. The 
City of London eventually agreed to a 25% 
increase and the redundancy notices were 
withdrawn. In 1970, McAlpine attempted to 
introduce non-union labour onto their site, but 
this was beaten back by the workers. 
Plumber Richard Organ recalled a bonus 
dispute with his subcontractor employer, on 
the John Laing site:
Laing’s workers had negotiated with Laing’s 
that, when they went on to what they call 
snagging work, towards the end of the job, 
they would be paid an average bonus.  And 
anyway, we approached our company for 
the same and they wouldn’t pay it. They said, 
no, there’s this retention money, and any 
snagging money has got to be paid out of this 
retention money, and so we argued against 
it and there was a proposal put to the shop 
that, because the company had dug in their 
heels, that we’d take industrial action, and we 
went out on strike, over this average bonus 
scheme. Our officials came in and negotiated 
with the company. They wouldn’t wear it at 
all, so our official in London at the time said, 
right, I’m going to make this strike official, and 
once that word was mentioned, that it was 
going to become an official strike. He used 
the arguments because  the main contractor, 
Laing’s men, the window-fitters, the plasterers, 
they were all getting this average bonus for 
this snagging work, and the plumbers were 
the only ones that weren’t getting it on the 
site and it was kind of unfair. And anyway, 
they…said, “Right, we’ll have to think about 
it,” and he said, “Well, you know, as from 
now, as far as I’m concerned,” he said, “I’ve 
got to go back to my executive,” he said, “but 
I think they’ll back me – I’ll make this strike 
official.” And anyway, it was made official, 
and I became the first plumber in the new 
amalgamated union to have an official strike 
made. Because the PTU had amalgamated 
with the ETU in ’69, and so we became 
the EEPTU. 
But although the plumbers won this particular 
strike, Richard Organ, who was only in his 
mid twenties at this time, would soon suffer the 
same fate as many other trade union activists 
on this site, once the contract began to 
wind down:
They paid everybody off?
No, some of them, they would transfer onto 
other jobs.  As the jobs were winding down, 
they were taking on new contracts or were 
involved in new contracts, and some of them 
would be made redundant, the ones that 
weren’t up to their normal standards, but all of 
the regular men, apart from me and John were 
transferred off the job, you know, in stages, 
as it was winding down.
But in your case, they sacked you?
Oh yeah.
Even though you had worked with them for 
quite a few years?
Oh yeah, but I’d been a thorn in their side, I 
got an average bonus system brought in, 
which they didn’t want it to be brought in. It 
cost them a bit of money. They weren’t making 
as much profit as they wanted to, obviously.
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In the period that followed, he would find it 
very difficult to get a job on the sites in London:
I’d had a bit of redundancy, I’d worked for 
the company about 10-odd years or more, 
and so I’d gone round  to different companies 
that were advertising for plumbers, and 
some of them, you’d ring up, you’d give your 
name, and they’d just say, “Oh, hold on a 
minute…oh, no, them jobs are gone now.” 
Sometimes, you’d go down for an interview 
and between the times you’d phoned them 
and went down for an interview the jobs 
had gone.
The union leaders appeared to be 
uninterested:
I went to my union and said, look I’m on 
the blacklist, and I said you’ve got to do 
something about this  – for being active 
for the trade union movement, then you’re 
getting blacklisted and you’re not able to 
get employment and you should be doing 
something about it, basically. If we’re 
working on your behalf, you should be 
protecting us.  But as I say, Frank Chapple 
was the General Secretary then and for 
whatever reason, he didn’t particularly like 
activists – we was all communists, though 
him and Les Cannon, who was the President 
of the union at the time, had both been 
communist members. 
Richard Organ eventually got a plumber’s job 
on the Post Office tower, and was employed 
by the General Post Office (GPO). He later 
worked on the newspaper presses in Fleet 
Street and today is active in the Greater 
London Pensioners Association.
Smaller scale strikes and disputes continued 
to occur. Pat Bowen recalls the incredible 
lengths employers went to try and introduce 
scab labour during some of them:
The one thing really stands out in me is when 
they were trying to bring scab labour in – this 
was to our site, not to the Myton site.  And …
they were bringing in ready-mix lorries – you 
know the big lorries which they have? About 
three or four of those sort of came in, and 
they’d gone through the picket, obviously, 
and they’d got a bit of stick from the picket, 
but, you know, not a lot, but actually, when 
they got onto the site, they actually had 
people inside the wheelie bit – it wasn’t 
turning, obviously, but there was about 10 
people inside each of these cement bits, and 
they got out, you know, to work on the site. 
And that was the most sort of radical sort of 
bit of, if you like, crossing the picket line I’d 
ever seen, that actually people would climb 
inside there, the risk involved in doing that, if 
somebody turned the bloody thing on – you’d 
get churned up!  But no, they came in and 
that was the worst sort of picket-breaking I’d 
seen actually.
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In 1971, the building process was again 
halted as a result of severe problems 
between one of the major contractors and 
the City Corporation. Once more it was the 
workers on the site who suffered as a result. 
Towards the end of March 1971 Turriff cut 
bonus payments to its workforce, claiming 
that responsibility for this lay with the City, 
which, Turriff claimed, had fallen behind on 
its payments.51 The average bonus payment 
was reduced from 32p per hour to 7½p per 
hour. The issue went to regional and national 
disputes commissions, both of which found 
in favour of the workers, but Turriff continued 
to refuse to pay the previously agreed bonus 
rate. In a letter to its 300 employees, Turriff 
claimed that the average wage on site since 
June 1970 had been £29.41, £13.33 of 
which was bonus. Over the same period, 
the company claimed that the comparable 
payment from the City of London was only 
£6.82.52 The company also released figures 
alleging that between July 1970 and January 
1971 it had paid out £443,000 on labour 
costs but received only £65,000 from the 
Corporation.53 Shortly afterwards, Turriff 
requested an inquiry into alleged contact 
between the BDC and John Laing and Sons, 
regarding the taking over of Phase II by 
that company. Laing stated that it had not 
been ‘officially’ approached by BDC on this 
matter.54 On 21 April, workers on the Turriff 
site walked out in protest at the company’s 
refusal to accept the decision of the disputes 
commissions,and were supported by 
several hundred workers from the other two 
Barbican sites. The Turriff workforce held a 
meeting and passed a number of resolutions, 
including asking all other unions to cease 
co-operation on the conciliation panels ‘which 
Turriff had ignored’, the ‘blacking’ of all 
Turriff sites and the establishment of a direct 
labour organisation by the Corporation, to 
complete the contract.55   
TURRIFF PREPARES TO LEAVE THE BARBICAN
51 LMA, BDC Minutes, 22 March 1971
52 TheTimes, March 25 1971
53 NA, LAB 43/632, Notes for the Record, Barbican site
54 The Times, 14 April 1971
55 Construction News, 29 April 1971
Richard Organ and daughter on one of the Barbican towers 
under construction in the late 1960s. 
Source: Courtesy of Richard Organ.
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56 NA, LAB 43/632, RT Morris to DB Smith, 27 April 1971
57 NA, LAB 43/632, CF Heron to DB Smith, 13 May 1971 
the final Phases
By November 1971, Turriff had left the 
Barbican and was replaced by John Laing. 
The City of London agreed a contract price 
of £1.4 million with Laing for the completion 
of phase II but, despite the fact that Turriff had 
already finished about 80-90% of the work, 
Laing eventually received over £4 million 
at the close of the contract in 1974. By the 
mid-1970s, most of the Barbican phases were 
trundling towards completion, all of them 
massively late and well over budget. Phase II 
eventually cost the City of London over £14 
million and Phase III over £11.5 million. But 
these spiralling costs pale into insignificance 
when placed next to phase V, the Barbican 
Arts Centre, which was eventually completed 
in 1982. Laing’s original tender was just 
under £14 million, which was revised up to 
£16.7 million by the time the job was started 
in 1971. By 1976, it had escalated to £55 
million and two years later had risen to £80 
million. January 1980 saw the estimated 
figure break through the £100 million mark, 
rising to £120 million by May the following 
year. February 1982 saw yet a further 
revision, to £153 million, and final figure was 
reckoned to be around £159 million, a 
ten-fold increase. 
Turriff warned the BDC that the position might 
‘deteriorate’ and that the ‘militants’ might seize 
control ‘at the expense of the union officials’. 
The NFBTO leadership considered that this 
was wishful thinking on behalf of Turriff, 
arguing that the company was doing its best 
to provoke a strike, in order to declare a ‘force 
majeure’, which would allow it to renegotiate 
its Barbican contract ‘for an extra £1 
million’.56  This view was broadly shared by 
top civil servants; Ministry of Labour official, 
C.F. Heron, commented that the decision by 
Turriff to cut bonus payments may well have 
been designed ‘to precipitate a situation which 
would bring pressure on the City, possibly as 
a result of government intervention, to ease 
the terms of the contract’.57 In the event, the 
stoppage was for only a half-day and work 
resumed the following morning. The City 
agreed to provide more money to Turriff, but 
this did not solve the deep financial problems 
of the company. In June, it cut bonus payments 
again, accusing the Corporation of having 




The completion of the arts centre in 
1982 marked the final conclusion of the 
re-development scheme. The Barbican is 
a project that has immense significance 
because it captured many of the emerging 
problems in the industry, particularly on 
large sites, in the areas of design, tendering, 
management, site organisation, wage 
relations, non-traditional occupations, 
health and safety and workplace relations. 
It exemplified all the difficulties experienced 
in accommodating to a changing labour 
process, which included the dominance of 
non-traditional occupations, new technologies 
and materials. In this respect, it is no 
accident that many of those interviewed 
who were active shop stewards in the works 
committees came from occupations such 
as scaffolding, concreting, cranedriving, 
shuttering and steelfixing. They were 
confronted by professionals struggling to 
design the details of such a complex and 
innovative concrete structure, but paying 
little heed to the difficulties their designs 
might entail for the workforce responsible 
for construction; a management schooled 
more in traditional methods, including in 
its approach to industrial relations, which 
remained adversarial when what was 
required was clear and respectful negotiation 
on all the untried health and safety, payment 
and contractual issues arising; and national 
trade unions, still embedded in traditional 
trade structures and failing to represent and 
accommodate to a very different labour force. 
From the workers’ perspective, the Barbican 
flagged up the negative consequences of 
some of the sharpest of the post-war changes 
in the industry’s wage and employment 
relations, such as the rise of labour-only sub-
contracting and the widespread use of bonus 
systems that were often chaotic and arbitrary. 
Both of these issues, and in particular the 
latter, provoked an industrial relations crisis 
on the site of quite historic proportions. This 
in turn exposed shortcomings in the trade 
union movement, highlighting the scale 
of the gap that existed between national 
officials and the rank-and-file members. By 
examining the disputes on the Barbican, it 
is possible to see the close relationships that 
existed between some trade union leaders 
and employers, which at times descended 
into downright corruption, and the manner 
in which many of those working in new 
occupations in the industry, or in occupations 
classified as non-craft, such as the scaffolders 
on the Myton site, suffered from severe 
inadequacies in trade union representation. 
Those scaffolders were part of the AUBTW, 
but this was still very much a bricklayers’ 
union, totally dominated by officials who 
had been in that occupation. In response to 
these shortcomings, and in an attempt to map 
out a trade unionised future for all building 
workers, regardless of occupation or ethnic 
background, the Barbican activists helped to 
develop the London Joint Sites Committee, 
which played a seminal role in the formation 
of the Building Workers’ Charter in 1970. 
These organisations would impact deeply 
on industrial relations in the industry in the 
1970s, eventually pressing for revolutionary 
measures such as nationalisation of the 
industry and the formation of a single 
building workers union, and leading the1972 
national building workers’ strike. It can be 
argued that, had the Barbican disputes not 
occurred, the degree of organisation among 
rank-and-file building workers might well have 
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been weaker in the early 1970s. Analysing 
the lock-outs on the Barbican, we can also 
see the role of ideology and appreciate how 
the apparently timeless narratives which 
dominate the British media and popular 
culture and seek to fix the blame for industrial 
disputes on ‘undisciplined’ shop stewards are 
ideological constructions, erected to defend 
the economic interests of employers and to 
block any real investigation into the workers’ 
grievances. In reality, the shop stewards on 
the Myton site were after little more than 
a stable wage system and better working 
conditions. That this fairly modest demand 
could provoke such intense hostility and 
criticism and lead to a thirteen month lock-out, 
followed by the blacklisting of many of the 
workers involved, shows the pervasive nature 
of such ideology. 
reflections
For the construction industry, the Barbican 
leaves a bitter if impressive legacy. How would 
the industry look like today had more heed 
and respect been shown to the concerns of the 
workforce, whether about health and safety, 
working conditions, pay or representation? 
Indeed, how would it look like today had those 
who showed such an intense commitment to 
its improvement not been often permanently 
excluded? From an architectural point of view, 
the Barbican represents an important and 
critical monument of the post-war era, one of 
the unique twentieth-century landmarks in the 
city of London. The architects who designed it 
and the engineers who planned its construction 
are now regarded as among the most famous 
and significant figures in their professions 
in the post-war era. The workers who built 
the Barbican are never referred to and their 
opinions vary on the nature of the project 
that they brought to life. Some appreciate the 
quality of the development; William Milne 
described it as ‘clever, clever stuff’, whilst for 
Richard Organ there is a sense of pride in the 
work he completed:
As I said to you, worked on the tower block… 
I’ve told people, the majority of the plumbing 
work that went into that… I did, so I feel quite 
proud about it. And I’ve been down there 
and walked round the complex after it was 
finished, when they had fish in the lake and all 
the gardens done, and it’s quite an impressive 
site, or complex. I’ve been into the Barbican 
Theatre, which is quite impressive.
Others saw it simply as another job, albeit 
one that was different from most others, but 
regardless of the differences, it is clear that 
for many of the workers their views on the 
Barbican reflect the struggles that took place 
on that site and the price that they sometimes 
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I learned a great deal about human nature 
and everything like that, but the most effect 
that I had most concern about in my later 
years was the effect it had on my family. 
They were the ones who suffered as a result. 
I could see, in my children, and ex-wife now, 
I could see that it affected them in a way 
that… you couldn’t calculate the effect that 
it had on them.  And not for the best not 
for good, so I never forgive that. That’s 
something I won’t forgive both employers 
and unions for. 
Michael Houlihan  
So what do you think now then, when you 
see the Barbican?
I don’t really…I don’t even take any notice of 
it, don’t even think about it.
Vic Heath
Well, I look at it, because my office is near 
there, my head office in London, and I 
think…I worked there, I think the Barbican 
was…a good site, and, as I say, I think a lot 
of people cut their sort of political teeth on it, 
and I bet, if you looked closely enough, you’d 
find loads of people who got their first sort of 
experience of trade unionism militancy on 
that site...some for good and some for bad. 
Pat Bowen
Yeah, I would say I talk about it with fond 



























Crane erectors on Laing Barbican site. Source: Courtesy of John Steeden. 
Flats on the Barbican Estate, photograph 1960s by John Gay. 
©  English Heritage. NMR Reference Number: AA098616.
Early stages of the Barbican scheme, photograph c.1963 by John Gay. 
© English Heritage.NMR Reference Number: AA099222.
Close up of Turriff tower block. Source: Construction News, 27 April 1967.
Crane erectors on Laing Barbican site. Source: Courtesy of John Steeden.
Building the crane on Laing Barbican site. Source: Courtesy of John Steeden.   
Crane erectors on Laing tower block. Source: Courtesy of John Steeden.
Barbican tower under construction. Source: Courtesy of Richard Organ. 
Barbican tower under construction. Source: Courtesy of Richard Organ.
Protest march in support of Turriff workers, including Lou Lewis (far right), 
October 1965. Source: Courtesy of Vic Heath. 
Lou Lewis (with loudspeaker) and other workers at a meeting on Barbican site. 
Source: Morning Star, 17 June 1966.
Leaflet produced by Myton strike committee in March 1967 
Source: Courtesy of Vic Heath
Picket on Myton site. Source: Morning Star, 21 February 1967. 
Headline. Source: Daily Mail, 22 February 1967.
Pickets at Myton site, including: Michael Houlihan (far left), Rolph Langdon 
(second from left), and Lou Lewis, (second from right). 
Source: Morning Star, 31 March 1967.
Mass picket at Myton site, following attempt to break strike. 
Source: Morning Star, 4 April 1967.
Lou Lewis and Rolph Langdon (right; second right) and supporters on their way to 
ASW disciplinary meeting, where the two were expelled from the union. 
Michael Houlihan is also in picture. Source: Morning Star, 4 May 1967.
Front page. Source: Morning Star, 17 October 1967. 
Mass meeting at Barbican, following police violence of previous day. 
Source: Morning Star, 18 October 1967.
Final rally on 2 November. Source: Morning Star, 3 November 1967. 
Leaflet for 2 November march. Source: Courtesy of Vic Heath.
Richard Organ and daughter on one of the Barbican towers under construction 
in he late 1960s. Source: Courtesy of Richard Organ.
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Back cover image (top): 
The Barbican re-development
Source: Morning Star 9 September 1966
Back cover image (bottom): 
Victorious Barbican building workers show union cards after strike on Turriff site
Source: Daily Worker, 15 October 1965
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The Barbican re-development was a 
major construction project, which began 
in the early 1960s and at its peak 
employed around a thousand workers. 
Designed by Chamberlin, Powell and Bon, 
the re-development was a combination 
of housing and landscaping, a business 
centre,school, and one of the largest 
arts centres in Europe, built across 40 
acres in the heart of the City of London. 
But the Barbican was also infamous 
for the problems that accompanied its 
development. This pamphlet tells the 
stories of some of the men who built the 
Barbican—it reveals how they built it,the 
nature of the problems they faced during 
the building, the manner in which they 
tried to overcome these problems, and the 
way in which, for some, their lives were 
changed forever as a result.
